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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine ways to prevent the terrorist use of a biological 
weapon of mass destruction. Intelligence sources from around the globe report that 
terrorist groups are developing the capability and the intention to deliver biological 
weapons of mass destruction. Four coalitions of governments were studied to examine 
stated health security policies and reported outcome of a large biological threat incident 
of H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 2009–2010. This thesis presented the results and 
proposed methods to enhance intergovernmental connectivity and information sharing to 
prevent a biological threat.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Intelligence sources from around the globe report that terrorist groups are developing the 
capability and intention to deliver biological weapons of mass destruction. This thesis 
examines ways to prevent the use of such weapons. Health security policies generally 
address intended actions of biological threat reduction; however, the actual actions of 
these policies occur in a space irrespective of geographical boundaries or governing 
jurisdictions, a space where sovereignty can clash with the sphere of influence needed to 
achieve a unity of effort.    
This thesis examines four government coalitions’ stated health security polices 
and reported outcomes of the 2009–2010 biological threat incident of H1N1 global 
pandemic influenza, and presents methods of enhancing intergovernmental connectivity 
and information sharing to address prevention strategies that will support the U.S. 
biological threat approach.     
A multi-jurisdictional intergovernmental unity of effort is needed to address the 
many sovereign territories that could be impacted by an offensive bioweapon. The lack of 
an intergovernmental common language presents a challenge to applying some of the 
methods utilized by the EU and U.S. Tribal Nations. In the challenge of a biological 
threat, the U.S. must operate beyond unity of command; intergovernmental unity of effort 
is necessary. A common language and appropriate communication mechanisms allow for 
unity of effort, yet maintain sovereignty.  
U.S. Tribal Nations and the EU use intergovernmental communication methods 
and liaison systems of lateral line leadership to produce shared situational awareness and 
perform necessary intergovernmental information sharing. Unlike the typical vertical 
command and control leadership structure, with lateral leadership the flow of information 
and influential decision making operates side-to-side in a system of self-governance. 
Thus, the EU’s and tribal nations’ information-sharing systems operate in a lateral line, 
supporting multi-jurisdictional decision making and producing intergovernmental 
governance methods to address large challenges.  
 xviii
Additionally, to produce the unity of effort in which functional shared situational 
awareness operates, governmental bureaucracies need connectivity. The various cultures 
and native languages of sovereign governing organizational structures are often invisible, 
yet the outcomes from intergovernmental and multi-jurisdictional barriers (such as time 
delays in developing decisions and implementing large scale action) are tangible. 
Connecting the “dots” of awareness and intelligence has been a challenge for Homeland 
Security. Yet, the intergovernmental shared situational awareness occurs in the space 
between the dots.  
The EU’s and tribal nations’ resources of diverse lateral line leadership and 
information sharing systems of communication methods provide lessons for the U.S. This 
thesis recommends actions to improve (1) shared awareness of risks and threats, (2) unity 
of effort across all participants in the homeland security enterprise, and (3) innovation 
through active application of leading-edge science and technology.  
U.S. intergovernmental unity of effort is enhanced across multi-jurisdictional silos 
of sovereignty by working cooperatively with the 10 U.S. National Health Security 
Strategy strategic objectives. These objectives strengthen the U.S. biological threat 
approach to support biological threat reduction and the potential innovation of methods of 
prevention of terrorist use of biological weapon of mass destruction.  
Some of this thesis’ recommended actions include (1) developing an 
intergovernmental communication mechanism with a lateral line system to enhance 
shared situational awareness and cross-border and homeland security global partnerships, 
(2) developing a medical intelligence intergovernmental support tool to simulate risk 
options for the deployment of biological threat countermeasures, and (3) integrating life 
sciences research and development for meta-intelligence products to improve biological 
threat countermeasures decision making. 
Intergovernmental shared situational awareness is powerful. The U.S. can 
enhance its intergovernmental leadership and unity of effort by taking action on lessons 
learned from the European Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Intelligence sources from around the globe report that terrorist groups are 
developing the capability and the intention to deliver biological weapons of mass 
destruction. One report concludes that a biological attack is likely by the end of the year 
2013 (Graham, Talent, Allison, Cleveland, & Rademaker, 2008). The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine ways to prevent the use of a biological weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD).   
The health security policies of most governments, however, need to be 
transformed to adequately prepare for, and where possible, prevent, such an attack. The 
discussion in the next few chapters will identify critical dimensions of this 
transformation. 
By far, the most important transformation step that governments can take is to 
establish urgently and aggressively a reorientation of their health security policies toward 
prevention of biological threats. Most governments’ policies are reactive and slow, 
rendering the impact of a biological attack much more destructive. 
Health security policies, however, need to work in a world with complex 
organizational and leadership designs. The nature of health risks requires coordinated 
actions across governments at various levels of jurisdiction, especially among 
international partners. Governments coordinate across various agencies, authorities, and 
disciplines. Finding ways to achieve this coordination in the prevention realm is the key 
to dramatically reducing both the possibility of a biological attack and minimizing its 
impact through fast, collective response. 
B. BACKGROUND  
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission World at Risk Report of 
December 2, 2008, on the “Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism” predicted 
that a WMD will be used “more likely than not” by the end of the year 2013. In August 
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2013, the United Nations was requested to investigate the alleged use of chemical 
weapons in Syria from an attack on Ghouta, near Damascus (Gardner, 2013). 
Surprisingly, the United States (U.S.) does not yet have a bold strategy to prevent the 
successful use of a biological weapon.   
What the U.S. does have is the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 2002). This strategy contains three pillars: counter proliferation, 
nonproliferation, and consequence management. It is written with the aim of threat 
reduction, not prevention. The strategy makes this clear in early discussion of counter-
proliferation: “We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in 
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists” 
(White House, 2002a). 
This pillar of counter-proliferation addresses interdiction to combat movement of 
necessary elements such as weapon materials, expertise, and technology to build, 
manage, and deploy such a weapon under terrorist or hostile states’ control. This is a 
critical step in prevention as the actions prepare the U.S. to counter or defeat the threat of 
an offensive, or intentional, use of a WMD. 
The nonproliferation pillar of the strategy seeks to prevent terrorists and states 
from successfully obtaining WMD. This pillar identifies utilizing diplomatic approaches 
to dissuade activities that cooperate with efforts of proliferant states, such as slowing 
access to supplies being sold or available to proliferant states and additional efforts to end 
WMD and missile programs (White House, 2002b). These activities support prevention 
by seeking to limit production or access to a bioweapon; however, they do not prevent the 
successful use of a bioweapon. 
The consequence management pillar addresses part of the U.S. defense response 
to the use of a WMD (White House, 2002c). These activities would occur in the time 
period after the use of a biological weapon. 
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1. Latency Time Period 
Biological agents have a latency period (Barrett & Goure, 2008, p. 1). During this 
length of time between the deployment of a biological WMD and the natural biological 
response is an opportunity to prevent harm, and, in effect, provide an effective 
countermeasure to the weapon. 
The challenge is that the deployed pathogen is not yet evident or active in this 
time period; the pathogen is virtually unseen during the latency period. Life sciences 
provide traditional biological surveillance tools for a natural pathogen. Epidemiology 
science provides a study of causes, distribution, and control of disease in populations. 
This information is presented in the diagnostic process of monitoring and identifying 
symptoms of a pathogen (UAB, Department of Epidemiology, 2005). 
2. U.S. Biological Threat Approach “Right of Boom” 
Strategies could possibly be employed to address manmade weapons of mass 
destruction, or an intentional release or dissemination of biological agents. However, a 
bold biological threat-prevention strategy is critically needed to address the threat of 
terrorist intentional release or dissemination of a bioweapon. If the need for creative 
approaches is urgent, then the United States must effectively deliver powerful resolutions 
to defend the U.S. homeland against the biological WMD threat. A key challenge to U.S. 
homeland security is that strategies of response and recovery are by default “right of 
boom” reactions to a biological incident that has already occurred. It is important to 
consider the “left of boom” biological threat-prevention possibilities because the power 
of prevention and threat reduction prior to an incident provide more opportunity to 
protect life and property than do activities after an incident. By limiting the strategic time 
period of focus to the period of response and recovery from a biological threat, the 
nation’s leaders are missing a worthy and necessary target component: the actual strategic 
prevention of the offensive use of biological weapons. The prevention element of the 
health security policies of the U.S. Tribal Nations and the European Union’s best 
practices could be beneficial to the U.S. This thesis will examine the intergovernmental 
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methods with the goal of identifying lessons that U.S. policymakers can utilize to 
strengthen the U.S. biological threat approach to support biodefense. 
3. Strategic Pre-Incident Medical Intelligence Framework 
Public health utilizes traditional medical intelligence techniques, such as bio-
surveillance, to perform disease identification and containment. For the purpose of this 
thesis, medical intelligence is defined per the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. 
military dictionary:  
The category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and 
environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to 
military medical planning and operations for conservation of the fighting 
strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign 
medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. (DoD, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2002) 
Traditional techniques operate with data elements from incident and post-incident 
time periods. Future potential prevention strategies will require pre-incident medical 
intelligence products accessible in the time period prior to when an offensive biological 
WMD is deployed. Yet, how will the precise prior time period be identified?   
Strategic methods of medical intelligence that include fundamental pre-incident 
data elements are not yet fully developed. Because these types of tools are not yet 
identified and included in the biological threat approach strategies, less opportunity exists 
to focus on pre-incident prevention elements. 
An innovative strategic medical intelligence framework could address the various 
challenges of transparent and timely information sharing. The framework should have the 
capacity to address various multi-jurisdictional culture and language barriers that delay 
decision-making; it should also work to achieve shared situational awareness (SSA). A 
strategic pre-incident medical intelligence framework could provide capability to 
determine potential at-risk populations in geographic areas and analyze potential at-risk 
disease hotspots prior to a disease outbreak in that specific area.   
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The medical intelligence needs of U.S. civil first responders are not addressed in 
the DoD policy definition of medical intelligence, which is used to address force 
protection. Yet civil force protection is part of the overall U.S. biodefense and response 
capacity for the homeland security discipline of emergency management and the nation’s 
public health disease management system. 
4. Time: A Non-Renewable Biodefense Resource 
Medical intelligence that incorporates strategic products can support pre-incident 
decision making for both policy makers and operational leaders. This pre-incident 
strategic medical intelligence would allow for better use of the non-renewable resource of 
time. This time could then be allocated for use in strategic multi-jurisdictional decision 
making to deploy countermeasures (for example, in the case of vaccine deployment) as 
well as support necessary crisis decision making (such as when there are vaccine 
shortages during a novel disease outbreak). A strategic pre-incident medical intelligence 
framework would provide a platform for building future prevention methods for the 
United States to address the threat of a biological WMD.    
5. Status Quo Biological Threat Political Paradigm 
Leadership and governance play is a key role in the potential prevention of a 
biological WMD incident. While addressing the issue of confronting biological threats to 
the Homeland, former Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland 
Security said, “The challenge is to act decisively to minimize damage in an environment 
in which there will be imperfect information and potentially hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of lives lost” (Birdwell, 2011). Yet traditional leadership roles do not appear 
comprehensive enough for present day and future disasters (Birdwell, 2011). The type of 
leadership necessary for developing and leading innovative biological threat prevention 
strategies will need to be fully addressed.   
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What lessons from health security policies of intergovernmental coalitions of 
governments can policymakers apply to improve the U.S. approach to prevent the use of 
a biological WMD? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH    
1. Prevention of a Biological Weapon of Mass Destruction 
The immediate users of the results of the present study will be the public health 
system (whose personnel serve as first responders in a potential biological WMD 
incident) and the nation’s intelligence communities. The conclusions and 
recommendations offered can enhance the strategies currently operating within the 
medical intelligence system and present a biological WMD prevention method utilizing a 
strategic pre-incident medical intelligence framework in support of the U.S. Homeland 
Defense National Health Security Initiative.   
2. Medical Intelligence in Support of Biodefense 
Results of the present study also add to the emerging discussion about medical 
intelligence. They bridge the issue for support of biodefense and national security. The 
impact is multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional in that medical intelligence is a 
contributing factor to many homeland security roles, such as law enforcement, 
transportation, military, public health, and other essential offices.    
3. Literature   
Results serve to fill a gap in the literature about prevention of a potential 
biological WMD and as a tool in addressing the unconventional threat of terrorism. 
Results identify future applications and research. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
War created a need for medical intelligence. As early as World War II, the U.S. 
Army Medical Intelligence Office (under the Army Surgeon General) was identified as 
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responsible for production of Medical Intelligence for the DoD according to the National 
Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) (Bidwell, 1986). 
Yet, global terrorism has changed the U.S. medical intelligence needs since 
September 11, 2001, in a fundamental way. Although there are earlier events than 2001, 
it was at the point that terrorism attacks targeted U.S. citizens on U.S. soil that the public 
health system role as a health and safety first responder shifted to include a civil defense 
role. However, from a larger scale event, the terrorist event of 9/11 placed our nation in a 
position to recognize a potential larger impact. Whether it was the emergency first 
responder role of public health to the experiences of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax 
attacks of 2001, public health was now lifted to a position of necessary first responder. 
This role existed previously, but the role of public health in civil defense simply was 
visible in the new light of attacks on U.S. soil. Public health added the role of 
administering the key available prevention methods for a biological WMD incident. 
Additionally, public health continues to lead the Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 
Public Health and Medical Duties and responsibilities for an intentional bioterrorism 
incident (Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], 2008). This new civil 
defense role has created confusion and operational stress in the current public health 
system (Siegrist, 1999). 
The scope of the literature reviewed includes publications such as journals, books, 
government documents, and popular media. The literature is organized into six 
categories:  biological weapons of mass destruction emerging threat risk; history of 
medical intelligence and product requirements; medical intelligence; countermeasures in 
the public health system; intergovernmental models that impact support to biodefense; 
and treaty rights, sovereignty and trust responsibility. 
1. Emerging Threat Assessment and Vulnerability of a Biological Attack 
Literature contains extensive discussion regarding threat assessment and 
vulnerability to a biological attack (Rhodes & Danado, 2007). Controversy exists over the 
significance of a biological threat, as what is considered a “successful” biological 
terrorist incident has not been determined. Additionally, disagreement exists in the 
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literature as to what is necessary to determine that the biological WMD threat is 
identified as a risk and to what degree the current risk status would measure the threat 
(Rhodes & Danado, 2007). Literature sources include federal government, military, and 
private sector research and development areas. The military and academic sectors provide 
the most succinct documents.  
Biological weapons are more destructive than chemical weapons, including nerve 
gas (Siegrist, 1999). The effects of a nuclear release or a biological weapons’ release is 
demonstrated in the anticipated casualties from a 10 kiloton nuclear release when 
compared to an intentional release of 10 kg of viable anthrax as a biological  
weapon (Siegrist, 1999). 
 
Figure 1.  Effects of a Nuclear and Biological Weapons Release  
(From Siegrist, 1999). 
Figure 1 shows that each biological weapon release has an impact relevant to the 
potential impact to environment or causalities depending on the geographical location of 
life in relationship to the actual release. A conversion table confirms that 10 kg of weight 
converts to approximately 22.0462 pounds. In perspective, this comparison estimates 
devastation from a biological weapon release of an amount of viable anthrax that weighs 
less than a 25 lb. bag of dog food. 
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The fast pace of current life sciences technology developments alters the future 
biological threat by providing potential access to aspects of biological weapons that have 
previously been less available for potential use by rogue terrorists (Rhodes & Dando, 
2007). The Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their 
Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats has identified that focusing on the 
known aspects of potential biowarfare is too narrow a view. Catherine Rhodes and 
Malcolm Dando identified in early 2006 that this committee highlighted that the 
unknowns of future biowarfare would need to be addressed by thinking differently about 
the future biological threat (Rhodes & Dando, 2007).  
2. History and Description of U.S. Medical Intelligence 
The concept of medical intelligence being applied to civil force protection in 
support of additional military force protection represents a gap in the literature, yet the 
civilian population continues to be a terrorist target.   The literature addressing the 
description and history of medical intelligence is broad and has been available for several 
decades. Most of the data regarding U.S. medical intelligence is provided by one sector 
of the federal government and the military: the U.S. Army Medical intelligence office, 
operated under the Army Surgeon General. Medical intelligence has also been produced 
for the DoD. Most of the medical intelligence content available typically addresses 
military force protection. Much of the approach to medical intelligence today is 
traditional in its focus on disease surveillance and medical intelligence strategies that the 
medical intelligence office produced when the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence Office 
was founded under the Army Surgeon General with WW II (Bidwell, 1986). Another gap 
identified in the literature is how medical intelligence applies to the public health system.   
3. Medical Intelligence Product Requirements and Foreign Focus 
The literature in the category of medical intelligence products are not yet fully 
developed to meet current public health and civil defense needs. Technology is advancing 
at a rapid pace, increasing the current medical intelligence needs. The literature regarding 
medical intelligence technology and its application to public health contains gaps. The 
category of medical intelligence products in general is unbalanced and incomplete. 
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The NCMI produces a wide variety of medical intelligence assessments based on 
customer requirements. Per NCMI, major medical intelligence product groups range from 
infectious disease alerts assessing the risk to U.S. forces from foreign disease outbreaks 
to assessing health risks associated from exposure in industrial facilities (Clapper, 2009). 
The general focus of the literature is on the biological threat to U.S. forces of an 
application of a foreign biological threat outside the domestic U.S. homeland. The 
literature contains a gap when it comes to addressing medical intelligence products to 
support the role of public health in civil defense of the potential use of a biological 
weapon within the United States.    
4. U.S. Medical Intelligence and Countermeasures in the Public Health 
System 
A significant gap in the literature and research around the concept of medical 
intelligence exists as it relates to the current status of the risk of a biological WMD 
incident. Medical intelligence appears to be struggling to keep up with the pace of 
advancements as they potentially apply to bioterrorism (Arredondo, 1983). Certainly, as 
the topic is applied to the public health system, more research is necessary. The concept 
of medical intelligence and how it relates to the potential capacity to access 
countermeasures, such as vaccine deployment in response to a biological WMD incident, 
is necessary.  
Vaccine appears to be the key medical countermeasure available. Literature on the 
topic of vaccines is robust, and the science of vaccine issues well studied over many 
decades (Goodman, 2007). The literature includes a segment of immunization data and 
use of vaccine as a countermeasure to the biological threat. A challenge of immunizations 
as a countermeasure includes various vaccine requirements of repeated dosing to achieve 
adequate protection. The implications of lengthy research, testing, and U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) processes for approval of vaccines is an area of controversy 
with ongoing debate to include issues such as vaccine safety, effectiveness, and possible 
side effects (FD&C Act Chapter V Sec. 505:355, 2010). There is a gap in the literature as 
to where the countermeasures in the public health system, such as vaccine and 
immunizations, interconnect to medical intelligence. 
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Response activities such as deployment of vaccine and placement capacity of 
sufficient numbers of medical professionals to perform immunizations are current 
challenges in the public health system during a routine and slow-moving natural disease. 
It is anticipated these challenges would be heightened during an intentional bioterrorist 
attack.   
Real time deployment response needs as applied to civil defense and the data 
surrounding geographical disease movement as applied to prevention strategies 
potentially utilized by public health and response decision-making are currently 
disconnected. The limited access to current U.S. medical intelligence for the public health 
system creates vulnerability in supporting civil biodefense capacity. Vulnerabilities 
include medical countermeasure deployment that is not timely in response. As a result, 
potential vaccine and prophylaxis measures may arrive after a deadly spread of disease 
and tip a population into impossible disease containment scenarios (Goodman, 2007). 
The characteristics of biological weapons lend themselves toward pre-exposure 
vaccine deployment and necessary mass immunization countermeasure strategies 
(Goodman, 2007). The harmful effects of biological weapons displayed after their release 
(Cole, 2007). This factor makes the biological threat a weapon of stealth. The bioagent 
danger is in both the intangible aspect of the initial exposure and the time delay of the 
harmful effects, which may be revealed too late to perform an effective application of a 
medical countermeasure. 
5. Treaty Rights, Sovereignty and Trust Responsibility 
The literature on key tribal issues such as treaty rights, trust responsibility, and 
sovereignty, is both useful and plentiful. The U.S. Constitution states that all Treaties 
made with Indian tribes are considered the supreme law of the land:   
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (U.S. 
Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: Supremacy Clause) 
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This is relevant to U.S. Homeland Security and National Security interests in the 
area of jurisdiction of various authorities and responsibilities regarding the U.S. 
Homeland. Yet the government processes, expectations, and interpretations of the 
implementation of leadership roles and governance of U.S. Tribal Nations and the U.S. 
federal, state and local governments vary in cultural awareness and understanding.   
The U.S. Tribal Nations currently report challenges with implementing and 
integrating current homeland security directives, which were highlighted in the recent 
H1N1 global pandemic influenza outbreak and the initial processing of priority 
populations driven by initial medical countermeasure, vaccine, shortages. As identified in 
the Homeland Security Fact Sheet of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI),  
In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, tribal governments are included in 
the definition of “local governments” or political subdivisions of the 
states. In contrast, tribal governments are recognized as separate 
sovereigns under the United States Constitution that do not derive their 
sovereign status from the States, and accordingly, the federal should 
continue to reflect the legal distinction between local and governments 
that are political subdivisions of the states and tribal governments. 
(Congressional Record, Vol. 149, No. 37, 2003)      
Past agreements and historical treaties, as well as current opportunities to address 
American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) health disparities impact the manner in which 
the U.S. Tribal Nations intergovernmental information sharing is performed.   Tribes in 
the United States must interact on a daily basis with various levels of intergovernmental 
relationships to perform tribal governance. The experiences of U.S. tribal communities 
may provide insights to the needs of effective intergovernmental relationships.   
6. Conclusion 
One element indicated in literature as prevention for a biological WMD is pre-
exposure vaccine delivery and immunizations as a countermeasure. The literature is 
incomplete and unbalanced concerning the topic of alternative methods of bioweapon 
prevention. Yet the issue of the medical countermeasure of vaccines and immunizations 
remains full of controversy concerning the implementation of vaccine delivery.   
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Literature and research contain a significant gap around the concept of medical 
intelligence as it relates to the current status of risk of a biological WMD incident. 
Medical intelligence appears to be struggling to keep up with the pace of advancements 
that potentially apply to bioterrorism. Certainly, as the topic is applied to the public 
health system, more research is necessary. The concept of medical intelligence and how it 
relates to the potential capacity to access countermeasures, such as vaccine deployments 
utilized toward a biological WMD incident, is necessary. However, the actual framework 
needed for application of medical intelligence in the public health system does not appear 
to be clearly developed. 
The themes in the literature describing (a) the history of medical intelligence, (b) 
the relevant threat assessment of a biological attack, (c) what type of medical intelligence 
products exist, and (d) what the current countermeasures are in the public health 
system—significantly, vaccine and immunization—indicate uncertain responsibilities 
assigned to the current public health system. Review of literature reveals that the 
significant prevention method identified for a biological WMD incident has been applied 
countermeasures of vaccine and immunizations. Vaccine and immunizations are 
deployed via the public health system. Yet a search of available literature failed to show 
how medical intelligence and the public health systems connect in counterterrorism 
efforts in national and homeland security efforts.  
F. METHOD 
1. Research Investigation Motivations 
Overall, the purpose of this research was to identify what lessons from health 
security policies of intergovernmental coalitions of governments’ policymakers could 
apply to improve the U.S. approach to prevent the use of a biological WMD. The U.S. 
appears to lack a strategy and plans to prevent the use of a biological WMD. This may 
indicate a belief that prevention is not possible. It is therefore important to investigate if 
other coalitions of governments have the same premise or, alternatively, if they have 
strategies and plans to reduce such a threat. Exploratory research was performed of 
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coalitions of governments’ transnational health security policies. This study involved six 
questions: 
a. Question 1 
Do coalitions of governments have a stated biological threat approach with 
intended actions (IA) for prevention of an offensive use of a biological weapon of mass 
destruction? The initial step was to identify if coalitions of governments that have 
transnational-type health security policies expect that prevention of a biological threat 
from intentional terrorist use is possible. Policy analysis was performed to assess if 
current health security policy identified prevention as a policy element and, if so, 
incorporated strategic biological threat prevention. 
b. Question 2 
What are the similarities and differences of the stated intended actions of 
the biological threat approaches of the coalitions of governments for the time period of 
prevention? Examples of global and national health security biological threat prevention 
policy were identified. The health security policies of the areas identified in the sample 
were used to study possible biological threat prevention strategies. 
c. Question 3  
What are the biological threat actual actions (AA) of the sample of 
coalitions of governments biological threat approach reported for the time period of 
prevention of a global biological threat incident?  This step examined if coalitions of 
governments that have transnational-type health security policies performed actions 
during an actual biological threat. Analysis was performed to assess if during the H1N1 
global pandemic of 2009–2010, the coalitions of governments identified prevention as a 
reported performance focus and, if so, incorporated strategic biological threat prevention 
actions.    
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d. Question 4 
What are the similarities and differences of the stated actual actions of the 
biological threat approaches of the coalitions of governments for the time period of 
prevention? A comparative study was performed using intergovernmental examples of 
the reported actual actions for time period of prevention within the sample’s after-action 
and lessons-learned reports from the H1N1 pandemic influenza 2009–2010. 
e. Question 5 
How do the stated intended action indicators compare to the reported 
actual action indicators of the biological threat approaches of the coalition of 
governments for the time period of prevention? A time period analysis of the H1N1 
global pandemic influenza 2009–2010 biological threat incident was used to examine 
decisions and actual actions of lessons learned. 
f. Question 6 
What recommendations can be made to improve U.S. biological threat 
prevention?  Lessons learned were identified and strategic recommendations proposed for 
furthering possible prevention methods to develop a framework for medical intelligence 
to support biodefense. 
2. Data Sample 
Intergovernmental examples of transnational biological threat approaches were 
examined and studied.   The European Union was selected because of its nation-to-nation 
role with its member states. The U.S. Tribal Nations were selected because of their 
government-to-government role with the United States.1  The Global Health Security 
Initiative and the United States were selected for inclusion in the study so as to give 
                                                 
1 Although not technically an official coalition entity by corporate structure, the tribal nations of the 
United States operate in a system of coalition to accomplish and approach tribe-to-tribe, as well as nation-
to-nation governance systems and structure with the United States government. Therefore, for the purposes 
of this study, tribal nations are identified as a coalition of governments and titled U.S. Tribal Nations in the 
sample. 
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comparison context to the placement of the EU and U.S. Tribal Nations within global and 
national health security policy initiatives. The thesis examines the nation-to-nation or 
government-to-government biological threat approach identified within health security 
policy in relationship to biological threat leadership decision making of reported actions 
of the same sample for a global infectious disease outbreak. The data collection, analysis, 
and interpretation of research findings were examined and investigated to draw 
inferences concerning causal relationships among the health security policy elements and 
infectious disease outbreak decision-making variables.  
3. Data Collection   
The data was collected from academic literature and abstracts, books, media 
sources, informational interviews, policy reviews, and documents such as government 
policy documents, laws, treaties, presidential directives, national strategies, emergency 
plans, memorandums, meeting minutes, H1N1 pandemic assessments, after-action report 
conclusions compiling strategic health security and national security policy. Overall, the 
analysis continually informed the data collection and the data collection continually 
informed the analysis.  
A study of transnational policy was conducted of global and national health 
security policies. The national health security policies were reviewed and assessed to 
identify and compare the biological threat approaches of the United States, the European 
Union, the U.S. Tribal Nations, and the global health security partnership of the Global 
Health Security Initiative (GHSI).   
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II. HEALTH SECURITY PREVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Question 1 (Q1):  Do coalitions of governments have a stated 
biological threat approach identified of intended actions for prevention of 
an offensive use of a biological weapon of mass destruction? 
 
A. Q1 METHOD 
1. Step 1a   
A sample of four coalitions of governments was selected. The four specific areas 
have the potential to have developed transnational health security policies. For the 
purposes of this study, the assumptions are that each government has identified 
responsibilities of self-interest. In that context, nations identified governing in a structure 
of a coalition of governments were considered. The coalitions of governments were 
selected to provide an opportunity to examine separate governance entities required to 
govern self-interests, yet voluntarily working together in cooperative purpose or joint 
action. The sample coalitions have opportunity to have considered or developed 
transnational health security policies to govern intended actions of biological threat 
prevention within a transnational health security goal. The health security policies 
provided a source of potential biological threat prevention strategies for further 
examination. 
Additionally, the coalitions of governments were selected because each had 
numerous opportunities and requirements to perform transnational health security policy 
development and actual actions of implementation of those health security policies with 
specific potential transnational impact to the area of biological threat prevention 
strategies and methods. The study of the biological threat-prevention strategies provides 
insight to biological threat prevention strategies that impact U.S. national security 
addressing the future prevention of the offensive use of a biological weapon of mass 
destruction.   
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Based upon the nature of the government-to-government relationship 
requirements, as well as the nation-to-nation responsibilities of each of the areas of the 
sample, the following four coalitions of governments A–D are the sample: 
a. Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI)  
Global Health Security Initiative is a voluntary partnership of nine 
member states made up of governments to address the mission of health security. GHSI 
members include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and the European Commission of the European Union. The World 
Health Organization is a technical advisor. 
b. European Union (EU)  
The European Union (EU) consists of 27 member states (nations). 
c. United States (U.S.) 
The United States consists of federal, state, local, and tribal governments 
consisting of 50 states and more than 500 federally recognized U.S. Tribal Nations.  
d. U.S. Tribal Nations  
U.S. tribes considered “domestic dependent nations” under the U.S. 
Constitution of the U.S. federal government consist of over 500 federally recognized U.S. 
tribes. 
2. Step 1b   
For each coalition of governments in the sample, documents that addressed the 
representing health security policies were gathered and examined for possible 
identification of the representative biological threat prevention approach for each area of 
the sample.    
The stated actions that each coalition of governments in the sample intended to 
take for a biological threat were identified as intended action in the difference calculation. 
The intended actions identified were coded into one or more of five categories: (1) health 
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security policy, (2) legal authority, (3) governance organizational structure, (4) key 
advisors, and (5) leadership organization. The stated intended actions of the various 
biological threat approaches were identified from the sample of coalitions of 
governments stated intended actions represented in their respective health security 
policies.  
A review of transnational health security polices was conducted of the sample to 
identify stated policy language and notate the nation’s biological threat prevention 
methods for further examination. The prevention strategy for each nation or coalition of 
governments was not documented in each of the nation’s health security policy in a 
similar manner. The larger snapshot of the nation’s biological threat approach was 
identified in order to access the possible biological threat prevention methods for review. 
This larger framework was identified within the health security policies by a review of 
the stated language addressing a biological threat.   
The noted methods and issues were then coded and later counted as a category 
that was found characteristic within the sample of coalitions of governments’ larger 
biological threat approach framework. Together the elements of biological threat 
prevention inherent within the larger biological threat approach represented the 
preventative framework that the coalition of governments demonstrated in the health 
security policies. For the purposes of this study, the stated intended actions identified are 
the preventative framework of the representative leadership for use in decisions for 
biological threat prevention. The stated intended actions were examined to determine if 
there was an intention by the governing nations in the representative sample to ultimately 
take preventative action against a biological threat or potential terrorist use of an 
offensive biological WMD. Each intended action was coded with one of five categories 
identified. The health security policy biological threat approach intended actions 
indicators identified to category types 1–5 include the following:  
1. Health security policy  
2. Legal authority   
3. Governance organizational structure  
4. Key advisors 
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5. Health security policy goals (priorities, objectives, strategies). 
B. Q1 ANALYSIS 
Sample areas A–D health security policy stated indicators of intended actions.  
 1a: The sample of coalitions of government each had identifiable 
indicators that demonstrated a biological threat prevention approach. 
 1b: Indicators of the biological threat prevention approaches were 
identified from the health security policies of the coalitions of 
governments. The stated intended actions identified in the biological threat 
approaches were then sorted into categories. 
The health security policies of the coalitions of governments were examined for 
indicators of intended actions which are represented in the Table 1.   
Table 1.   Health Security Policy Biological Threat Approach Indicator  
Intended Actions Results 
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 A. GHSI health security policy examination identified 22 indicators of 
intended actions within the five categories. 
 B. EU health security policy examination identified 27 indicators of 
intended actions within the five categories. 
 C. U.S. health security policy examination identified 56 indicators of 
intended actions within the five categories. 
 D. U.S. Tribal Nations’ health security policy examination identified 44 
indicators of intended actions within the five categories.  
C. Q1 KEY FINDINGS  
1. Key Findings 
 Each of the sample areas A–D evidenced an intention to prevent a 
biological threat in its respective stated health security policies.    
Indicators of intended actions addressing a health security 
biological threat were found from stated in the health security 
policy language of the sample of four coalitions of governments to 
include the Global Health Security Initiative, the European Union, 
the United States and U.S. Tribal Nations. These indicators of the 
biological threat prevention approaches of the sample were 
identified by indicators sorted to five key categories: (1) health 
security policy, (2) legal authority, (3) governance, (4) key 
advisors, and (5) policy goals (priorities, objectives, strategies).   
 The collective of the indicators sorted into the five categories for 
each of the coalitions of governments in the sample were then 
identified as the biological threat approaches utilized for further 
examination for this study. 
 The United States held the highest score in the number of coded 
indicators of intended actions in the identified biological threat 
approaches of the four areas of the sample. This result may appear 
to counter the premise that the U.S. lacks prevention activities; 
however, an evaluation was not performed as to the activities 
themselves, rather an examination of indicators of the activities in 
both stated intended actions and reported lessons learned actual 
actions. One of the values in the indicators were collaborative 
partners and the examination of the U.S. health security policies 
revealed additional stated partners which was one reason that 
increased the indicators of a U.S. biological threat approach. The 
European Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations, respectively, held the 
next highest indicators intended actions scores.   
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The biological threat approaches identified in the study of Question 1 were used 
in the next steps of the study to further examine biological threat prevention methods. 
2. Patterns and Trends 
The health security policies do have various stated intentions that combine 
addressing a natural biological threat or a manmade biological threat. However, the 
health security policies of the sample were not found to have a specific biological threat 
policy identified as “biological threat prevention.”   
The representing nations within the sample of the coalitions of governments do 
not use the same language to address prevention of a biological threat in the respective 
health security policies. The policies do not have a similar or specified area for defensive 
biological threat policies for potential terrorist use of biological weapon of mass 
destruction. For example, the Global Health Security Initiative ministerial statements 
Belgium, December 2008 state, “Strengthening Global Health Security. The GHSI will 
continue to make a concerted effort to share best practices in borders management for the 
purposes of health security, assess the effectiveness of chosen approaches and 
technologies, as well as to align strategies, where appropriate” (GHSI, 2008). The GHSI 
further states their health security mandate as follows: 
The mandate of the GHSI is to undertake concerted global action to 
strengthen public health preparedness and response to the threat of 
international CBRN terrorism. In 2002, pandemic influenza preparedness 
and response was included in the mandate, given the linkages to health 
security. Lessons learned from a range of incidents, including both 
intentional and naturally-occurring events, inform work undertaken in 
support of this mandate. (GHSI, 2001, p. 2).    
In comparison, the United States health security language states more of an all 
hazard approach in the language. For example, “The National Health Security Strategy 
(NHSS) is the first comprehensive strategy focusing specifically on the Nation’s goals of 
protecting people’s health in the case of an emergency. The purpose of the NHSS is to 
guide the Nation’s efforts to minimize the risks associated with a wide range of potential 
large-scale incidents that put the health and well-being of the Nation’s people at risk, 
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whether at home, in the workplace, or in any other setting. In this context, national health 
security is achieved when the Nation and its people are prepared for, protected from, 
respond effectively to, and able to recover from incidents with potentially negative health 
consequences” (U.S. National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
2009). 
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III. HEALTH SECURITY POLICY BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
PREVENTION TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISON  
Question 2 (Q2):  How is the time period of prevention of the stated 
intended actions similar or different between the biological threat 
approaches of the coalitions of governments?   
A. Q2 METHOD 
1. Step 2a   
The sample areas A–D biological threat approaches identified in Q1 were utilized 
for Q2 and sorted into time periods to identify the stated intended actions of the time 
period of prevention. To do this, the criterion for the term prevention was developed and 
labeled to further study biological threat prevention as it applies to the specific biological 
threat approach of the sample’s coalitions of governments. Next, the criteria for the time 
period of biological threat prevention were labeled and the criteria for the four stages of 
emergency management were developed and labeled. Finally, the sample’s identified 
biological threat approach indicators were sorted into four time periods.   
To identify indicators of prevention within the biological threat approaches of the 
sample, the differences of the biological threat approaches were sorted, coded, and 
categorized by time periods. The data was coded into one or more four types of time 
periods that were then labeled “time tiers” as described in Table 2. The indicators which 
were sorted, coded, categorized, and identified by time periods and activity period of 
prevention were then examined. To further study of the prevention scope of the larger 
biological threat approach, differences of the coalitions of governments’ intended actions 
were compared for the time period of prevention of terrorist use of a biological WMD 
within the sample’s stated biological threat approach. The biological threat approaches of 
the coalitions of governments were then identified by the time period of prevention. The 
stated intended actions were coded into one or more of four time categories with the 
following criteria: 
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a. Time Tier 0 (TT0)  
Time Tier 0 (TT0) is the time period of a pre-incident prevention measure 
that occurs prior to an incident or event. Criterion for indicator assumption is that the 
biological threat can be prevented and the intended action or actual action is to stop or 
counter the biological threat. The prevention action indicator criterion is to anticipate and 
act in advance of a biological threat incident so as to forestall, avert, hinder, counter, 
thwart, or stop the biological threat occurrence. 
b. Time Tier 1 (TT1)  
Time Tier 1 (TT1) is the time period of a pre-incident preparedness 
measure that occurs prior to an incident or event. Criterion for the action indicator 
assumption is that the biological threat will occur and the intended action or actual action 
is to prepare for the biological threat. The preparedness action indicator criterion is to 
place in a position or condition of a state of readiness for the biological threat occurrence. 
c. Time Tier 2 (TT2)  
Time Tier 2 (TT2) is the time period of an incident or event response 
measure. Criterion for the action indicator assumption is that the biological threat is 
occurring and the intended action or actual action is in response to the biological threat. 
The response action indicator criterion is to answer, in words or action, to the biological 
threat occurrence. 
d. Time Tier 3 (TT3)  
Time Tier 3 (TT3) is the time period of a post-incident recovery measure. 
Criterion for the action indicator assumption is that the biological threat has occurred and 
the intended action or actual action is in recovery to the biological threat. The response 
action indicator criterion is to take action to regain, restore, or return to any former or 
better state or condition such as existed prior to the biological threat occurrence. 
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2. Step 2b  
Tallies for each time period were computed and comparisons were drawn between 
the coalitions of governments. 
B. Q2 ANALYSIS 
Sample areas A–D biological threat approaches of coalitions of governments 
stated intended actions of prevention. 
 2a: Each coalition of governments had identifiable stated intended actions 
specific to prevention within its biological threat approaches identified 
from the respective health security policies. 
 2b:  The stated intended actions of the biological threat prevention 
approaches were identified from the coalition of governments’ health 
security policies sorted into categories by the indicators and into time 
periods of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The 
indicators for the time period of prevention were separated for 
examination. The time period of prevention results for the sample: 
 A. GHSI health security policy examination identified 16 
biological threat prevention stated intended actions representing 
72.72% of its health security policy identified goal. 
 B. EU health security policy examination identified 27 biological 
threat prevention stated intended actions representing 100% of its 
health security policy identified goal. 
 C. U.S. health security policy examination identified 36 biological 
threat prevention stated intended actions representing 64.28% of its 
health security policy identified goal. 
 D. U.S. Tribal Nations health security policy examination 
identified 39 biological threat prevention stated intended actions 
representing 88.64% of its health security policy identified goal. 
 2c.The calculation method below was used to identify the percentages for 
the sample. The sample indicators are counted across time periods. 
Because an area in the sample may have elected to utilize the indicator in 
more than one time period, the periods of time tiers 0–3 can potentially 
sum more than 100%.   
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Table 2.   Health Security Policy Biological Threat Approach Indicator Intended 
Actions Results Time Periods TT0–TT3 
 
 
Figure 2.  Calculation of Indicators’ Percentages 
The total number of biological threat approach (BTA) indicators in Figure 2 is 16 
for the biological threat approach indicators that were either stated in health security 
policies of the sample or reported to specific time periods by the sample’s after-action 
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and lessons-learned reports for the sample and used as a baseline number that was 
equivalent to 100%, thus, 16 =100%. This number was divided by the BTA indicators for 
given time periods. (The example in Figure 2 is 22, which is the total of the overall 
biological threat approach indicators.)  The result of the division (0.7272) was converted 
to a percentage by multiplying it by 100, thus giving a final percentage of 72.72%. 
C. Q2 FINDINGS  
1. Key Findings 
 Prevention of a biological threat is a key stated health security policy element 
for each coalition of government. More than 50% of the intended actions 
stated in the health security policy biological threat approach are stated in the 
period of prevention (TT0).Yet the time period with the largest number of 
stated intended action indicators scored for the sample of the coalitions of 
governments of stated health security policy were identified in the time period 
of response (TT2).   Areas A, C, and D each ranked their highest scores in the 
A: 22 and C: 56 and D: 44 category of the time period of response (TT2). The 
subtotal, 122 of the 149 biological threat approach elements identified 
represent 81.88% of the total examined elements score to the response 
category of intended actions. The second highest score ranking of the 
coalitions of governments stated intended actions of the represented health 
security policy biological threat approach was identified in the time period of 
preparedness (TT1) for all of the sample areas A–D.  
 An exception was identified in the results identified to the area (B), European 
Union. The European Union scored the highest (B: 27) in the time period of 
prevention (TT0) category. 
 Comparison of the sample within the time period of prevention reveals the 
second highest score ranking was the area (D), U.S. Tribal Nations (D: 39). 
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Figure 3.  Health Security Policy Biological Threat Approach Indicators of Intended 
Actions by Time Period Prevention TT0 Results Areas A–D 
2. Patterns and Trends 
The health security policy study of the biological threat approach of areas A–D of 
the Global Health Security Initiative, the European Union, the United States, and U.S. 
Tribal Nations identify three similar patterns in the findings for the action phase areas of 
preparedness, and response, and recovery. These action phases are found in the time 
periods for time tiers 1–3. However, a difference in the areas of A–D in the action area of 
prevention is found in the time period of TT0.   
While each of the areas A, B, and D were found to be higher in the prevention 
action phase in the time period of TT0, a trend was found in two of the areas. 
Specifically, the area (B), European Union, and area (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, were found 
to have a higher propensity toward the action phase of prevention that is found in the time 
period of TT0. Figure 3 reflects areas B and D which trend differently in the prevention 
action phase and time period of TT0 in the graph in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4.  Health Security Policy Biological Threat Approach Intended Actions by 
Time Periods of Time Tiers 0–3 Areas A–D 
The chart of graphs below depicts the comparison of the time periods of action 
phases for the indicators of intended actions identified in the biological threat approaches 
for the sample areas A–D. Figure 5 indicates a comparison of the sample area’s indicators 
of the intended actions in each time period to that same sample area’s own possible 100% 
factor of the same area’s biological threat approach. That is, if the indicators in that time 
period of the same sample area were 100%, the percentage would appear on the graph 
versus what percentage the indicators are stated in the health security policy by time 
periods. Figure 5 reflects a comparison of the biological threat approaches by time 
periods each to the other areas of the sample. 
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Figure 5.  Health Security Policy Time Tiers 0–3 Biological Threat Approach 
Indicators “Intended Actions” Results 
The pattern of overall propensity identified in the health security policy intended 
action indicators to the time period of prevention in two of the areas is the basis of the 
focus the following examinations in the study of area (B), the European Union, and Area 
(D), U.S. Tribal Nations. The model of intergovernmental leadership for the coalitions of 
governments in the areas (B) the European Union, and (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, appears 
to be leading these two specific areas of the sample in the direction of prevention to 
address a biological threat.   
The sample area (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, appears to be leading in a stronger 
propensity toward the time period of prevention over the area (C), the United States, yet 
the U.S. is identified as a key advising governing and regulatory body to the U.S. Tribal 
Nations in a biological threat incident or event. 
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IV. H1N1 GLOBAL PANDEMIC BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
PREVENTION ACTIONS  
Question 3 (Q3):  What are the biological threat actual actions of the 
sample of coalitions of governments biological threat approach reported 
for the time period of prevention of a global biological threat incident? 
A. Q3 METHOD 
1. Step 3a   
After-action documents from the global biological threat of the H1N1 pandemic 
influenza of 2009–2010 were gathered.   
2. Step 3b   
The sample areas A–D biological threat approach actual-action indicators were 
identified and coded into one or more of five categories. A biological threat incident 
event was identified which impacted the entire sample of areas A–D in order to study the 
time period of prevention within the biological threat approaches of the reported actual 
action indicators of the sample of coalitions of governments. The actual action indicators 
for the identified global infectious biological incident reported by the sample were 
examined for potential trends and patterns by time periods. The global H1N1 pandemic 
influenza of 2009–2010 was selected as the biological threat incident identified for the 
study of the samples’ reported actual action indicators representing a global transnational 
biological threat. The reported actual actions were examined to determine if there was an 
identifiable focus by the governing nations in the representative sample to ultimately 
address the time period of preventative action against a biological threat or potential 
terrorist use of an offensive biological WMD. The actual action indicators reported were 
coded into one or more of five category types from the coalitions of governments’ H1N1 
influenza global pandemic reports of after actions and lessons learned. Health security 
policy biological threat implemented action indicators were coded into one or more of the 
following five types 1–5: 
1. H1N1 Health Security Policy Biological Threat Actions Performed 
2. H1N1 Challenges 
 34
3. H1N1 Strategic Strengths 
4. H1N1 BTA Health Security Policy Strategic Vision Recommendations 
5. H1N1 BTA Health Security Policy Leadership Organization 
Recommendations (Strategies and Priorities) 
B. Q3 ANALYSIS 
Sample areas A–D BTA actual action indicators   
 3a: The sample coalitions of governments each had identifiable indicators 
that demonstrated a biological threat prevention approach in the reported 
lessons-learned and after-action reports of the global H1N1 pandemic 
influenza incident of 2009–2010. 
 3b:  Indicators of the biological threat prevention approaches were 
identified from the H1N1 after-action and lessons-learned reports of the 
coalitions of governments. The reported actual action indicators identified 
in the biological threat approaches were then sorted into categories.   
The after-action and lessons-learned reports of the H1N1 global pandemic 
influenza of 2009–2010 of the coalitions of governments were examined for biological 
threat approach indicators of actual actions. The results for the sample are below and 
represented in Table 3: 
1. H1N1 Biological Threat Approach Results 
 A. GHSI lessons-learned and after-action reports examination identified 
29 indicators of actual action indicators within the five categories. 
 B. EU lessons-learned and after-action reports examination identified 37 
indicators of actual action indicators within the five categories. 
 C. U.S. lessons-learned and after-action reports examination identified 26 
indicators of actual action indicators within the five categories. 
 D. U.S. Tribal Nations lessons-learned and after-action reports 
examination identified 21 indicators of actual action indicators within the 
five categories. 
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Table 3.   H1N1 2009–2010 After-Action Reported Lessons-Learned Biological 
Threat Approach Indicators of Actual Actions Results 
 
C. Q3 FINDINGS 
1. Key Findings  
Biological threat approach was identified for each of the coalitions of 
governments in the sample. The examination of biological threat approach indicators of 
actual actions were identified in the respective sample of coalitions of governments 
reported lessons-learned and after-action reports addressing an actual health security 
biological threat. The H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 2009–2010 was utilized as an 
actual biological threat global incident for the purposes of this study.    
The sample was the same four coalitions of governments: the Global Health 
Security Initiative, the European Union, the United States and U.S. Tribal Nations. Of the 
four areas in the sample coalitions of governments, the area (B), European Union, ranked 
with the highest number of biological threat approach indicators of actual actions.   
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The biological threat approaches identified in the study of Question 3 of an actual 
biological threat incident of H1N1 were used in the next steps of the study to further 
examine biological threat prevention methods. 
2. Patterns and Trends 
 A specific biological threat prevention policy was not clearly identified in 
the lessons-learned or after-action reports for the sample. 
 The absence of common language to describe the biological threat 
approach of the sample of coalitions of governments that was found in Q1 
from examination of the stated health security policies was also found in 
the reports, for the same sample, of the lessons learned and after action of 
the H1N1 global pandemic influenza event of 2009–2010. 
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V. H1N1 GLOBAL PANDEMIC BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
PREVENTION TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISON  
Question 4 (Q4):  How is the time period of prevention of the reported 
actual actions similar or different between the biological threat approaches 
of the coalitions of governments?   
A. Q4 METHOD 
1. Step 4a 
Each actual action was coded into one or more of the four time categories of Q2: 
 TT0 pre-incident prevention measure 
 TT1 pre-incident preparedness measure 
 TT2 incident response measure 
 TT3 post-incident recovery measure 
2. Step 4b 
Tallies for each time period were computed and comparisons were drawn of 
H1N1 biological threat approach indicators within the five categories between the 
coalitions of governments. 
In order to identify the prevention elements within the sample’s actual biological 
threat approach utilized during H1N1, the differences of the indicators of the biological 
threat approaches of the sample were identified by time periods. To identify prevention 
elements within the biological threat approaches of areas A–D, the biological threat 
approach reported actual actions were sorted, coded, and categorized by time. Time 
periods were coded into one or more of four categories of time periods labeled “time 
tiers” as described in Table 4. The sample of coalitions of governments actual actions 
were examined for analysis. The identified biological threat approach identified in Step 
3a represented the sample coalitions of governments reported actual actions for a 
biological threat for the purposes of this study.   
 The numbered reported biological threat approach elements were subsequently 
sorted, coded, and categorized by time periods for further analysis. These time periods 
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were identified as time tier 0 through time tier 3 according to the action phase of the 
specific biological threat approach element of the standard emergency management cycle 
utilized in each of the respective coalition of governments. This emergency management 
cycle is prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
The differences found in the sample’s reported actual actions for time period of 
prevention within their reported biological threat approach were examined and compared. 
Results and findings of the analysis which identified the various differences of the 
biological threat approach of the sample coalition of governments reported actual actions 
in the H1N1 pandemic influenza 2009–2010 by time periods. 
The biological threat approach reported in after action and lessons learned of the 
H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 2009–2010 of the coalitions of governments were 
then identified by the time period of prevention. To identify prevention elements within 
the biological threat approaches of areas A–D, the differences of the biological threat 
approach elements were sorted, coded, and categorized by time periods. The data was 
coded into one or more of four types of time periods that were then labeled “time tiers” as 
described in Table 4. Note:  it is possible for one indicator to appear in multiple time 
categories depending on where the sample area may have used an indicator in another 
time period choice. Any of the biological threat approach indicators may appear in 
multiple time categories based upon each of the sample’s stated health security policies 
or the sample’s after action lessons learned reported of the H1N1 global pandemic 
influenza.  
Differences of the coalitions of governments’ actual actions were compared for 
the time period of prevention of terrorist use of a biological weapon of mass destruction 
within the sample’s stated biological threat approach. 
To further study the prevention scope of the larger biological threat approach 
reported in the after-action and lessons-learned reports of H1N1 of the sample for the 
time period of prevention, elements that were sorted, coded, categorized, and identified 
by time periods were then examined.  
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B. Q4 ANALYSIS 
Sample areas A–D biological threat approach stated actual actions and prevention:  
 4a: Each coalition of governments had identifiable intended actions within 
its biological threat prevention approach identified from the after-action 
and lessons-learned reports. 
 4b:  The actual action indicators of the biological threat prevention 
approach were identified from the coalitions of governments’ after-action 
and lessons-learned reports and sorted into categories. The results for the 
sample:  
 A. GHSI H1N1 global pandemic reported in the time period of 
prevention category 15 actual action indicators representing 
51.72% of the GHSI after action and lessons learned. 
 B. EU H1N1 global pandemic reported in the time period of 
prevention category 25 actual action indicators representing 
67.57% of the EU after action and lessons learned. 
 C. U.S. H1N1 global pandemic reported in the pre-incident period 
category 5 actual action indicators representing 19.23% of the U.S. 
after action and lessons learned. 
 D. U.S. Tribal Nations H1N1 global pandemic reported in the time 
period of prevention category 10 actual action indicators 
representing 47.62% of the U.S. Tribal Nations after action and 
lessons learned. 
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Table 4.   H1N1 2009–2010 After-Action Reported Lessons-Learned Biological 
Threat Approach Indicators of Actual Action Results 
 
C. Q4 FINDINGS  
1. Key Findings 
The scores of the indicators of the time period of prevention (TT0) category did 
not rank high in any of the areas A, B, C, or D. Neither of the prevention time period 
rankings were the first nor second highest ranking rate for reported actual actions of the 
biological threat approach elements of the H1N1 biological threat event for the sample of 
this study. Yet both the sample areas (B), European Union, and (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, 
trended higher scores in the time period of prevention than their advisory or 
advisory/regulatory areas. The area (B), European Union, compared to the area (A), 
GHSI, and the area (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, compared to the area (C), the U.S.   
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The sample areas (B), European Union, and (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, both 
reported higher biological threat prevention actual actions than their advisory coalition of 
governments. The GHSI serves as an advisory to the European Nations’ leadership on 
biological threat. The United States serves as an advisory and federal regulatory 
governing body to the tribal nations. Both sample areas trended in a different direction 
than their respective advisory governments in the time period of prevention for the 
reported actual actions of the biological threat incident studied.  
The time period of focus of the reported actual action indicators of the coalition of 
governments’ biological threat approaches of the H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 
2009–2010 were used in the next steps of the study to further examine biological threat 
prevention methods. 
Table 5 represents the differences of each area’s A–D actual action indicators of 
the sample of the coalitions of governments reported H1N1 lessons-learned biological 
threat approach of the time periods of prevention (TT0), preparedness (TT1), response 
(TT2), and recovery (TT3). The emphasis of time periods are identified per the results of 
the reported actual actions biological threat approach indicators scored per time period of 
each of the samples. For the purposes of this study, the biological threat approach 
indicators for each of the areas of the sample to include the Global Health Security 
Initiative, the European Union, the United States and the U.S. Tribal Nations are 
representative of the actual action indicators identified in their respective global or 
national health security H1N1 Influenza Global Pandemic 2009–2010 after-action and 
lessons-learned reports.    
To further study the prevention scope of the actual actions reported for the 
sample’s H1N1 after-action and lessons-learned reports, the specific indicators of the 
time period of prevention were sorted, coded, and categorized by time periods, and then 
examined and compared. Results and findings of the analysis identified the elements for 
the time period prevention (TT0) (see Table 5). 
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Table 5.   H1N1 2009–2010 After-Action Reported Lessons-Learned Biological 
Threat Approach Indicators of Actual Action Results Time Period TT0 
Prevention 
 
 
Table 5 also depicts the reported actual actions of the H1N1 biological threat 
incident examination. The area (B), European Union, results in the time period of 
prevention of TT0 higher than the area (A), Global Health Security Initiative; and the 
area (D), U.S. Tribal Nations, results in the time period of prevention of TT0 higher than 
area (C), United States. These results are interesting in that both areas A and C of the 
sample were coalitions of governments that serve in an advisory, and/or regulatory 
capacity to the areas B and D.   The Global Health Security Initiative is a key health 
security advisor to the European Union and the United States is a key advisor to the U.S. 
Tribal Nations. 
2. Patterns and Trends 
The study of the actual action indicators is similar to the pattern of the biological 
threat approach of the sample.  
 A pattern emerged that identified key transnational partners, the Global 
Health Security Initiative, and the European Union, as well as key U.S. 
Tribal Nations homeland defense partners, are trending to function and 
perform health security policy biological threat decision making that 
focuses on building capacity to perform prevention of a successful terrorist 
use of a biological weapon of mass destruction. In contrast, the 
examination of indicators reflects that the United States appears to be the 
exception with the focus of indicators representing the time period of 
prevention being the lowest of the U.S. rankings. The time period of 
response scored the highest within the U.S. rankings, with the time period 
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of preparedness scoring the second highest within the U.S. time period 
rankings.  
 Figure 6 identifies that key transnational partners to the United States, 
such as the Global Health Security Initiative and the European Union, are 
trending to increase function of health security policy biological threat 
decision making that occur in the time period of prevention.   
 Additionally, key U.S. Tribal Nations homeland defense partners’ 
biological threat approach indicators also reflect a trend toward the time 
period of prevention above the indicators identified of the U.S. national 
biological threat approach. The U.S. is one of the U.S. Tribal Nations’ 
identified key intergovernmental advisors. 
 
 
Figure 6.  H1N1 2009–2010 After-Action Reported Lessons-Learned Biological 
Threat Approach Indicators of Actual Action Results Time Periods TT0–TT3 
 
 44
 
Figure 7.  H1N1 Global Pandemic Influenza 2009–2010 Biological Threat Approach 
Reported After Action Indicators of Time Tiers 0–3  
The results of the lessons learned reported of the H1N1 influenza global pandemic 
2009–2010 reveal that although the time period of prevention (TT0) is stated as a key 
strategy and time period for the biological threat approach of each of the areas A–D, the 
actual actions of the reported biological threat approach in the respective H1N1 lessons-
learned reports’ scores were identified highest in the time period of response (TT2). 
Response biological threat approach elements are when a biological threat has occurred 
and response is activated.   
Government leaders emphasize intergovernmental strategies and resources to 
specific health security policy phases of emergency management. These phases of 
emergency management, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, are within 
time periods. The time period chosen for placement of the intergovernmental strategies 
and resources can limit or enhance methods available for leadership decisions within that 
specific time period. Ultimately, the time period that the strategies and resources are 
placed within can determine how robust the biological threat approach capacity can be. 
For example, a strategy that is placed and implemented in the time period of prevention, 
which is before the incident occurs, can build toward the prevention of the terrorist use of 
a biological WMD. However, a response or recovery time period includes the loss of 
opportunity to prevent the incident, because the incident has already occurred. 
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The response period (TT2) results highlight a health security policy element that 
are in the time period as and after an incident is occurring. The time period of response is 
typically operating from a base of reactionary decision-making elements to address a 
biological threat incident. The sample areas which select the time period of prevention 
(TT0) focus health security policy elements that are proactive decision-making elements 
to a biological threat incident. These decision-making time periods vary in both the risk 
management time protection needs and the potential access to time as a resource to 
address a biological threat.   
Reactionary decision-making elements tend to be performed in a short-term 
window with intense speed. Prevention forecasting and decision-making elements tend to 
be performed in a long-term window with purposeful speed based upon consideration of 
multiple factors across multiple time periods.   
Further study is needed to access both decision making time factors in active 
development time periods. 
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VI. PERIOD OF PREVENTION TIME IN HEALTH SECURITY 
POLICY AND H1N1 GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISON  
Question 5 (Q5):  How do the stated intended action indicators compare 
to the reported actual action indicators of the biological threat approaches 
of the coalition of governments for the time period of prevention? 
A. Q5 METHOD 
1. Step 5  
Tallies for each time period were compared between the stated intended actions 
and the reported actual actions of the identified biological threat incident of H1N1.   
2. Step 5a   
A comparison of the number of pre-incident stated health security policy intended 
actions for time period of prevention and the number of the biological threat incident of 
H1N1 post-incident indicators of reported after-action reports was performed.   
The biological threat approach time period of prevention for stated indicators of 
intended actions of the sample’s health security policies were examined for potential 
differences or similarities. The intended actions were then compared to the indicators of 
the reported actions of the identified biological threat incident of the H1N1 pandemic 
influenza infectious disease outbreak of 2009–2010 of the same sample. The results of 
the difference between the intended actions and the actual actions were studied.   
The biological threat approach for the coalition of governments in the same 
sample, (A) Global Health Security Initiative, (B) the European Union, (C) the United 
States, and (D) the U.S. Tribal Nations, was identified as representative of the respective 
leadership decisions identified in the sample of global or national health security policies. 
The time period of prevention of the sample’s biological threat approach was 
identified as the time period “left of boom” of the use of a biological weapon of mass 
destruction. The actions of the coalition of governments were studied to examine any 
divergent or inconsistent actions in the area of the representative intentions to address a 
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biological threat. The number of category-type elements identified in the stated intended 
actions biological threat approach was then compared to the study of the number 
identified in the sample’s reported actual actions of the biological threat incident studied. 
Any divergence of the stated intended actions was identified by the actual actions within 
stated and reported time periods. The divergence in the categories was then counted to 
determine a score for each of the sample coalitions of governments. This score, labeled 
the difference of percentages, was the total derived from the following calculation 
process.   
3. Step 5a Difference Calculation (DC)  
DC Step 1 of the health security policy biological threat approach difference 
calculation steps of intended actions (IA) and actual actions (AA): 
 HSP BTA IA DC Step 1a:  Identified the number of indicators of the 
health security policy stated intended actions representing areas A–D 
indicators total as 100%. 
 HSP BTA IA DC Step 1b:  Identified the number of indicators of the 
health security policy stated intended actions representing areas A–D by 
time period. 
 HSP BTA IA DC Step 1c:  Compared the stated intended action indicator 
scores to the after-action indicator scores by time tiers 0–3 in areas A–D.   
DC Step 2 of the H1N1 biological threat approach variance rate steps: 
 H1N1 BTA AA DC Step 2a:  Identified the number of indicators of the 
global biological threat incident of H1N1 reported after action 
representing areas A–D indicators total as 100%. 
 H1N1 BTA AA DC Step 2b:  Identified the number of indicators of the 
global biological threat incident of H1N1 reported after action 
representing areas A–D by time period. 
 H1N1 BTA AA DC Step 2c:  Compared the global biological threat 
incident of H1N1 reported after-action indicators representing areas A–D. 
4. Step 5b 
DC Step 3 Comparison of the HSP and H1N1 to identify potential gap or 
difference of IA to AA: 
 DC Step 3:  The stated intended action indicator scores to the after-action 
indicator scores by time tiers 0–3 in areas A–D to the initial health 
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security policy intended action indicators scores and the global biological 
threat incident of H1N1 reported after-action scores representing areas A–
D.   
 C Step 3a:  For the purpose of this study, the difference of percentages is 
any gap identified from the comparison of the intended action indicators 
and the after-action indicators by time period percentages. The identified 
percentage of the initial total available indicators by area compared to the 
identified percentage of the indicators scores by time period of time tiers 
0–3 per the sample areas A–D identified any potential gap or difference of 
percentages.   
The indicator scores of the sample were examined to determine the trend of health 
security intended actions to address a future biological threat and compare it against the 
trend of actions that became the emphasis or focus of the sample implemented in a 
biological threat incident.  
Table 6.   Difference of Biological Threat Approach Indicators  
Time Periods TT0–TT3 
 
 
The variance rate represents the relationship difference of each area’s A–D results 
per time periods. The time tiers identify action phase time periods at three key incident 
phases on the time period continuum:  the pre-incident time period or “left of boom,” the 
incident time period as “boom,” and the post-incident time period or “right of boom” as 
after a biological threat incident occurs. 
The purpose of this section of the study was to examine differences or similarities 
of the intended actions compared to the actual actions. This examination will assist to 
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identify whether the focus of resources by time periods, specifically to the time period 
that is considered “left of boom” (TT0 and TT1), will inform possible future biological 
threat approach strategies for the United States. 
B. Q5 RESULTS 
Sample areas A–D biological threat approach differences of stated intended 
actions of health security policy versus reported response actual actions of sample 
biological threat incident H1N1 2009–2010 and prevention: 
 5a:  Key results of the difference of percentages comparison data for time 
tiers 0–3 of the sample areas A–D: 
 5b:  Highlights of the key data results of the difference of percentages 
comparison of the intended action indicators compared to actual action 
indicators are listed below. Key results of the variance rate comparison 
data for the time period of prevention TT0 of the sample areas A–D 
include the following: 
 A. GHSI indicator scores compared difference of percentages was 
-21. 
 B. EU indicator scores compared difference of percentages was 
-32.43. 
 C. U.S. indicator scores compared difference of percentages was 
-55.35. 
 D. U.S. Tribal Nations indicator scores compared difference of 
percentages was -41.02. 
 5c: The highest intended action indicators score in the time period of 
prevention time tier 0 was reported to area B:  The European Union. 
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Table 7.   Difference of Biological Threat Approach Indicators Time Periods  
TT0-TT3 Areas A–D Comparison 
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C. Q5 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
1. Key Findings 
Each of the areas in the sample reflected differences in the percentages of its 
respective scores. When compared, the biological threat approach indicators of the 
reported actual action indicators were not found to be consistent with the identified 
biological threat approach stated intended action indicators of the sampled coalitions of 
governments by time period. The stated intended action indicators in the biological threat 
approach of all areas A, B, C, and D for nearly each of the categories and classifications 
reflect that they outscored the reported emphasis of the biological threat approach actual 
action indicators reported. The indicator scores were scoring higher stated intended action 
indicators of the sample’s biological threat approach stated in health security policy when 
compared to the indicator scores that the same sample reported in the lessons-learned and 
after-action reports of the global biological threat of the H1N1 incident. So, indicators of 
stated intended actions toward the coalitions of governments’ biological threat approach 
by time period were higher than the results of the reported actual action indicators. For 
example, the time period of prevention stated intended actions were higher scores than 
the implemented actual action indicators for that same time period. 
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Figure 8.  Comparison by Time Periods of Health Security Policy Indicators to 
H1N1 Global Pandemic Influenza 2009–2010 Indicators  
Figure 8 depicts the examination and comparison results of both the stated 
intended action indicators and the reported actual action indicators of the H1N1 
biological threat incident of all four time periods within each separate sample area. For 
example, the samples of each of the four areas are depicted separately, with scores for 
each of the four time periods grouped together representing the results of the same area. 
This allows comparison and examination of that area’s entire program operations for each 
of the four time periods, to include prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
The area (B), European Union, results in the time period of prevention of TT0 
resulted in higher scores than the area (A), Global Health Security Initiative, and the area 
(D), U.S. Tribal Nations, results in the time period of prevention of TT0 higher than area 
(C), United States. These results are interesting in that both areas A and C of the sample 
were coalitions of governments serving in an advisory, and/or regulatory capacity to the 
areas B and D, yet they are reporting a lower focus of reported indicators in the time 
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period of prevention. The Global Health Security Initiative is a key health security 
advisor to the European Union, and the United States is a key advisor to the U.S. Tribal 
Nations. 
Table 8.   Difference of Biological Threat Approach Indicators By Time Periods to 
Time Periods TT0–TT3 Areas A–D Comparison 
 
 
Table 8 depicts the examination and comparison results of both the stated 
intended action indicators and the reported action indicators of the H1N1 biological threat 
incident of the same time period in a comparison of each of the areas A–D. For example, 
the time period of prevention in time tier 0 is reflected by each of the four areas in a 
comparison of the same time period. This allows comparison and examination of each of 
the time periods separately and of the intended action indicators to the actual action 
indicators by time period. 
2. 5c: Prevention Time Period Gap   
Results of a variance rate comparison of time tiers 0–3 identified a difference in 
the time period of prevention time tier 0 where the stated intended action indicators of the 
health security policies were compared to the reported actual action indicators of the 
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H1N1 global pandemic for each of the coalitions of governments. The prevention time 
period actual action indicator results comparison identified lower scores in the time 
period of prevention time tier 0 than the intended action indicators stated in the health 
security policies in a comparison examination across all of the sample areas A–D.   
3. Patterns and Trends 
For the time period of prevention time tier 0, each of the sample areas A–D scored 
lower in the reported actual action indicators of the H1N1 biological threat incident than 
the same sample of areas stated in its health security policy intended action indicators. It 
appears the coalitions of governments potentially developed and approved health security 
policy to address a future biological threat with a higher focus emphasis on the 
prevention time period, the stated intended actions indicated in their respective health 
security policies overall were higher than what each of the areas A–D reported as actual 
actions. The intended actions preferred toward the concept of prevention in policy were 
higher than the actual actions of a biological threat incident. 
When the areas A–D discussed, approved, and then put into stated health security 
policy the respective coalitions of governments intended actions per indicators studied, 
the time period of prevention time tier 0 scored higher than any of the same sample 
reported discussions, and focus of resource concerns, issues, strategies, and priorities in 
the overall after-action and lesson-learned reports. 
Although each of the sample areas A–D have higher indicator scores for the 
intended actions over the reported after-action indicator scores, area (B), the European 
Union, had the highest score in the time period of prevention. The European Union also 
was the only area that scored a positive variance rate score. The sample area with the 
highest percentage of the time period of prevention indicators in the health security 
policy intended actions had the only improved or positive variance rate. This was scored 
by area (B), the European Union. The potential gap was found to be 0. The intended 
action indicators identified a positive number when compared to the H1N1 actual action 
indicators. The positive number identified an increase of the focus of resources and 
strategies reported in the actual action indicators of the biological threat incident of H1N1 
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when compared to the intended action indicators stated in that area’s health security 
policy. The total number of indicators, area (B), the European Union, had a VR score of 
5.71%.   
The stated health security policy included the time period of prevention 27 
indicators of 27. Likewise, the European Union’s reported after-action indicators score 
was the highest of the sample in the time period of prevention with 25 of 37 reporting 
67.57%. So the only areas of the sample that potentially improved or overreached their 
intended actions by reported actual actions in specific time periods were the preparedness 
time period of time tier 1 and the response time period of time tier 2.   The time period of 
preparedness appears to have the most improved score. 
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VII. LESSONS LEARNED FROM INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COALITIONS TO ENHANCE U.S. APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL 
THREAT PREVENTION 
Governments can be challenged when trying to achieve coordinated action in 
multi-jurisdictional problems, like that of the biological threat (Moynihan, 2009). In the 
search for a few valuable, successful experiences, two approaches to intergovernmental 
coordination stand out: the work of the European Union’s intergovernmental 
communication mechanism and tribal forms of governance. The information-sharing 
systems are distinctive organizationally by the capacity to exchange information across 
sovereign command control jurisdictional borders while harnessing a necessary 
intergovernmental span of influence to address the complex problem of a biological 
threat over expansive territories. 
These positive, constructive intergovernmental experiences reveal innovative 
approaches that improve the likelihood that prevention will be the focus of policies, that 
the necessary cooperation will be achieved, and that the leadership required to guide 
these organizations will be effective. 
In the sections that follow, this thesis examines these communication mechanisms 
and intergovernmental information-sharing approaches by looking at the processes used 
by the European Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations. It also discusses the need for a 
common health security language in order to enhance intergovernmental unity of effort. 
Additionally, this thesis discusses the swarming effect in nature2 and how that effect 
becomes a preventative countermeasure that protects both the individuals and the group.  
Most significantly, this thesis discusses the space between the dots. The space 
between the dots allows the European Union and U.S. Tribal Nations to get to the 
                                                 
2 National Geographic staff member Peter Miller, in “The Genius of Swarms,” explains, “A single ant 
or bee isn’t smart, but their colonies are.  The study of swarm intelligence is providing insights that can 
help humans manage complex systems, from truck routing to military robots.  Deborah Gordon, Stanford 
University biologist reports, “Ants aren’t smart.  Ant colonies are.”  Miller explains ants utilize swarm 
intelligence to solve problems, “A colony can solve problems unthinkable for individual ants, such as 
finding the shortest path to the best food source.”  See National Geographic website for more information: 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/07/swarms/miller-text. 
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protection issues of prevention and allows them to move quickly in specific time periods. 
This thesis shows that working in that space—the space between the dots—and sharing 
information can make it possible for the U.S. to move more quickly than possible with 
conventional methods. 
A. LANGUAGE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL UNITY OF EFFORT FOR 
THREAT REDUCTION 
1. Homeland Security Challenge   
Each of the sample intergovernmental coalitions evidenced the intention to 
prevent a biological threat by indicators’ studies in the respective stated health security 
policies. However, no common health security policy language exists, resulting in a lack 
of common intergovernmental context and guidance of how to address global and 
national prevention of a biological threat. Additionally, the policies do not have a similar 
or specified area for defensive biological threat policies in the event of potential terrorist 
use of a biological WMD.   
Health security policy may serve to guide leaders’ decision making in the event of 
a biological threat or a potential terrorist offensive use of a biological WMD. Not having 
a stated U.S. health security policy of biological threat prevention that has language 
common to the intergovernmental native language can impede efforts of both 
transparency and global threat management, and ultimately the potential decision-making 
speed between intergovernmental leadership.    
A robust health security policy could impact the quality and depth of developed 
prevention methods available as technical guidance and support for leadership decision 
making. The quality and depth of the health security policy biological threat prevention 
strategies also impact the successful delivery of prevention actions. The successful 
application of prevention strategies to the biological threat remains vulnerable when 
those strategies have not been fully resourced or developed. 
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2. Opportunity   
By having access to a common global and national language of intended actions 
in health security policies regarding the prevention of biological threats, 
intergovernmental unity of effort can be enhanced and threat reduction achieved. 
3. Data and Discussion  
The following sections examine the data and discuss the thought process that led 
to identifying the challenge. These sections look at intergovernmental and multi-
jurisdictional unity of effort and how it can be achieved within the command and control 
structure. Unity of effort can be accomplished by adapting and utilizing the meta-
leadership model and developing connectivity; however, it needs a common language. 
Accordingly, the meta-intelligence method is a tool that can make a common 
organizational language possible. 
B. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL UNITY OF 
EFFORT 
You need to understand that you’re never going to achieve unity of 
command as we know it in the military, and you have to do your best to 
achieve unity of effort. There are always going to be a lot of different 
authorities and jurisdictions for the different Cabinet departments and 
agencies, and your real challenge is to try to bring all that together and 
point it in the same direction; trying to converge on single effects you’re 
trying to achieve. That’s a lot more difficult than it sounds.  
–Adm. Thad Allen (USCG-Ret.) 
One of the challenges of homeland defense and national security is addressing 
multi-jurisdictional and transnational issues in a world where activity in one distant 
location can impact global security. No one sector, organization, or single leader can 
accomplish the successful prevention of terrorist use of a possible biological weapon of 
mass destruction. As Admiral Thad Allen (USCG-Ret.) describes, the challenge of 
current and future disaster management will require leadership who develop, muster, and 
direct utilization of disaster resources across a crisis. To address global and national 
security challenges, and specifically biological threats, this type of leadership must 
successfully lead a multi-jurisdiction, and often intergovernmental, unity of effort.  
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What type of leadership might perform such a necessary and challenging feat?  
The National Preparedness Leadership Initiative (NPLI),3 Dr. Leonard J. Marcus, Colonel 
(Ret.), Dr. Isaac Ashkenazi, and Dr. Barry Dorn have pioneered the development of the 
conceptual basis for “meta-leadership,” a leadership model that specifically addresses 
various crisis circumstances requirements (Marcus, Dorn, Henderson, 2006). The meta-
leadership model presents concepts for intergovernmental leadership that “strategically 
[link] the work of different agencies and levels of government” (Marcus et al., 2006). 
Marcus describes the need for meta-leadership in relationship to the U.S. 
government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Going forward, better communication and coordination among all levels 
of government, or “connectivity,” will prove crucial. That means not just 
harnessing electronic technology to forge links among agencies, but also 
building relationships between people—transforming a culture that 
champions independent decision making into one that values  
cooperation. (Kiewra, 2006) 
The inclination to view leadership as a top-down process of leader leading 
follower, typical of hierarchical organizations, often obscures the complexities of 
leadership. The boss-to-employee relationship is formalized in clear roles, rules, job 
descriptions, and responsibilities with prescribed performance and productivity 
expectations (Fernandez, 1991). This dyadic image, however, does not capture what 
occurs when leaders in bureaucratic organizations seek to influence and activate change 
well beyond the established lines of their decision making and control. Meta-leadership is 
mission focused, and these leaders, driven by a purpose broader than that prescribed by 
their formal roles, are therefore motivated and capable of acting in ways that transcend 
usual organizational confines.    
                                                 
3 Of significance is that the NPLI is an initiative developed in collaboration with the leadership of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the White House Homeland Security Council, the United 
States Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense, and thus integrates different 
governmental organizations.) 
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C. META-LEADERSHIP MODEL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL UNITY 
OF EFFORT 
The meta-leadership concept is the performance of a type of broadly envisioned, 
overarching leadership that is not focused on unity of command, but rather on a unity of 
effort powered by influence. “Meta-leadership is particularly valuable in situations where 
the leader must rely more on influence than authority and where one must lead beyond 
traditional organizational boundaries” (Marcus et al., 2006). 
The five dimensions of the meta-leadership model, as seen in Figure 9, are (1) the 
person, (2) the situation, (3) lead the silo, (4) lead up, and (5) lead connectivity (Schein, 
2004). Each of these dimensions works together to make a collective impact. Shein 
explains that meta-leaders “seek to achieve results that cannot be accomplished by one 
organization, unit, or department alone” (Schein, 2004). The model bases the production 
of organizational connectivity on a hierarchical framework that operates within the levels 
of each dimension. Another crucial component is that a meta-leader often operates 
without owning direct authority. Via the influence of vision and leadership, the meta-
leader may integrate activities in the method of unity of effort “by intentionally linking 
the efforts of the many people and many otherwise disconnected organizational units” 
(Schein, 2004, pp. 3–4). 
 
Figure 9.  The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership (From Schein, 2004) 
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1. Meta-Leadership Potential to Impact Intergovernmental Connectivity 
Connectivity is needed at all levels of government in order to create unity of 
effort. Meta-leadership is a method to enhance intergovernmental connectivity. Adm. 
Thad Allen identifies achieving unity of effort as a target for managing the catastrophic 
incident. Elements of the meta-leadership model impact the organizational connectivity. 
Allen highlights tools that meta-leadership provides: a method to manage across 
stovepipe organizations, and the interrelationship of subject-matter experts and policy 
leaders. The meta-leadership model points to a method to manage the important interface 
of those two key resources (Marcus, Ashkenazi, Dorn & Henderson, 2007). According to 
Marcus et al., “In practice, it is a puzzle of optimally engaging three facets—up, down, 
and across—of organizational connectivity: who are the many people that must be 
influenced and how can they best be leveraged to prompt forward motion?” (2007, p. 5). 
Likewise, the necessary organizational interconnectivity utilized by the meta-
leader and discussed by Marcus, Ashkenazi, Dorn, and Henderson is the type of large-
scale interconnectivity that the intergovernmental leader seeks to mobilize, steer, and 
direct for successful outcomes in large incidents. The meta-leader accesses that necessary 
interconnectivity via the collaborative process. The value of the concept of meta-
leadership is not only in the outcome, but also in the “collaborative value,” which is a 
tangible process (Marcus et al., 2007, pp. 3–4). By identifying the gaps between what 
could or must be done and the will and capacity to do those things, meta-leaders coalesce 
the knowledge, organizational workings, and frame of reference to achieve an otherwise 
unachievable cohesion of effort (Kotter, 1996). 
2. Challenges of the Meta-leader  
Bureaucratic leadership using traditional models that operate on command and 
control via position of authority versus a position of leading that operates primarily on 
influence often have personal challenges with meta-leaders within the leadership’s 
organizational structure or jurisdictional purview. The traditional bureaucratic official 
who is rigidly devoted to administrative procedure struggles with the very nature of the 
visionary big-picture type objectives of the often influential meta-leader. Thus, meta-
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leaders are frequently seen as “trouble,” “going against the grain,” or “seeking to work 
outside the box,” because they may appear to not be building or protecting bureaucratic 
turf and territories.   
The juxtaposition of these two very different leadership models presents a 
dilemma of prevention methods. To say that the bureaucratic official, whose job security 
relies on the impact of positional chain-of-command authority, must consider performing 
as a meta-leader is paradoxical. The segregation of mission and responsibilities often 
created by various revenue streams, as well as federal, state, and local laws and 
regulations, has developed through centuries of operation. The United States’ founding 
fathers brought patriarchal hierarchies with them while they were fighting for freedom.   
Perhaps both influence-driven and positional leadership models are required to 
address the problems of catastrophic events due to the nature and size of the 
intergovernmental landscape and multi-jurisdictions governing the catastrophes. Research 
indicates that intergovernmental meta-leaders require organizational and leadership 
models that employ influence to move large concepts across various national bodies, such 
as the health security policy needs of biological threat reduction. 
3. Recommendation 
Using meta-analysis, develop a strategic meta-intelligence model to support future 
intergovernmental intelligence products. This recommendation includes evolving meta-
analysis to develop a homeland defense intelligence product that will support required 
biological threat decision making by applying the concept of the meta-leadership model 
to leaders’ biological threat approach decision-making strategy needs. The proposed 
model is a strategic meta-intelligence concept which operates in cooperation with the 
meta-leadership model to develop intelligence products which serve to strengthen the 
U.S. biological threat approach (see Appendix for details of the meta-intelligence 
concept). Meta-leadership references the meta-research concept that “seeks systematic 
themes across many lines of study” (Marcus et al., 2007). The proposed meta-intelligence 
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model concept incorporates five dimensions4 to provide an organizational framework for 
classifying the layers of a biological threat that require national security intelligence 
products to support timely decision making for biological threat reduction.   
To produce senior leadership awareness so that critical biological threat decisions 
can be completed, the meta-intelligence product must successfully reach the necessary 
decision-making leaders in a timely manner through the organizational chain of 
communication. Thus, the intelligence products must process through individual leaders 
and organizational cultural paradigms. Often the intelligence product is either not 
produced, or, if presented, it does not successfully complete the entire communication 
journey.   
Due to barriers encountered via the intergovernmental chain of communication 
(such as organizational constructs, operating silos, and cultural barriers), ultimately, the 
intelligence product may fail to produce the necessary leadership awareness for timely 
and accurate decision making. Thus, time and resources that could support leadership’s 
decision making in addressing biological threat reduction would be lost. A solution to this 
challenge may be found within the meta-intelligence model concept, which could support 
integrating the meta-leaders’ influence into the intelligence foundation of the decision-
making process. This would be done via a system of intelligence products that speak to 
each other in order to provide the context of a problem such as the biological threat. In 
this manner, the barriers that are a part of information silos to comprehensive critical 
thinking and timely decision making could be addressed in a new way. 
The proposed meta-intelligence products would utilize each organization’s 
identified organizational native language. The meta-intelligence model process could 
enhance operability and increase support tools for necessary decision making. This, in 
turn, would support biodefense by performing information sharing within multi-
jurisdictional problems so senior leaders would have increased opportunities to direct 
timely action based partly upon emerging medical intelligence necessary for biodefense. 
                                                 
4 The five dimensions of the meta-intelligence model are intelligence for (1) the biological threat 
individual meta-leaders, (2) the biological threat situations or events, (3) the biological threat culture silos, 
(4) the biological threat context leading up, and (5) the biological threat connectivity leading across. 
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Meta-intelligence would include, as a piece of the puzzle, an intergovernmental applied 
significance of intention, with native organizational language providing additional 
cultural context to support the original intelligence product.   
Medical strategic meta-intelligence products would support policy makers and 
help operational leaders perform necessary and timely biodefense decision making. The 
meta-intelligence model proposed includes performing meta-analysis and developing 
national security intelligence products within the five dimensions. These five dimensions 
work in cooperation with the meta-leadership model. 
D. LATERAL LEADERSHIP, INFORMATION SHARING AND THE TIME 
PERIOD OF PREVENTION 
1. Homeland Security Challenge    
The challenge is to increase the United States’ biological threat approach time 
period prevention indicators by using multi-jurisdictional information-sharing processes. 
The health security policies of transnational partners of the United States, such as the 
Global Health Security Initiative, the European Union, and U.S. Tribal Nations, each 
have more indicators than the U.S. for the sample’s respective biological threat 
approaches identified in the time period of prevention. As Figure 10 shows, the European 
Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations had the highest scores of indicators in health security 
policy for the prevention period. 
 
Figure 10.  Health Security Policy Biological Threat Approach Time Period 
Prevention Indicator Results  
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The pre-incident time is a valuable time to assess and analyze information so as to 
consider the implications of decisions that impact opportunities to successfully address 
the offensive use of a bioweapon. Once the incident occurs, the opportunity to address 
prevention for that incident is lost.  
The U.S. biological threat approach challenge is to identify strategies to prevent 
and reduce the biological threat. One method may be to increase the United States’ 
biological threat approach time period prevention indicators, as both the European Union 
and U.S. Tribal Nations have higher scores of indicators in the prevention period. This 
thesis examines the intergovernmental methods introduced by health security policies by 
which the European Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations perform multi-jurisdictional 
information sharing in order to provide lessons which support improving the U.S. 
biological threat approach.   
By increasing the biological threat approach indicators within the health security 
policy for the prevention period (TT0), the U.S. may increase access to the necessary 
assessment and analysis of biological threat conditions for the purpose of biological 
threat reduction. Multi-jurisdictional information-sharing processes may make it possible 
to achieve a more robust base of data and knowledge in order to develop meaningful 
intelligence products that will support decision making when addressing the prevention 
strategies in cases of terrorist use of a bioweapon. 
2. Opportunity 
Utilize intergovernmental information-sharing methods supporting biological 
threat reduction activities for the prevention period in order to enhance the leadership 
decision making necessary to address future biological threats.   
3. Data and Discussion 
The following sections examine medical intelligence methods of the European 
Union and the U.S. Tribal Nations in an effort to learn how to increase the United States’ 
biological threat approach time period prevention indicators by using multi-jurisdictional 
information sharing processes. 
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VIII. EUROPEAN UNION MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL 
A. EUROPEAN UNION STRUCTURE AND HEALTH SECURITY 
OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
INFORMATION SHARING MECHANISM 
1. Information Sharing Approach to Increase Shared Situational 
Awareness (SSA) 
The European Union developed what the Health & Consumer Protection 
Directorate-General termed the EU Coordination Mechanism (EU Commission, Health 
Threats Unit SANCO C3, slide 30, 2005). The Health Threat Unit (HTU) operates the 
Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF) to implement alert and warning systems 
and surveillance, and to provide preparedness planning and support via tools such as 
digital mapping. This type of alert and coordination system then shares information to the 
EU member states, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 
additional rapid alert systems, and the Global Health Security Network (GHSN). In turn, 
those entities feed and share information into the system. The European Union uses this 
core information-sharing system to develop and maintain an SSA among the entities. The 
European Union coalition of governments developed the multi-national coordination 
mechanism that operates as the HTU (see Figure 11) and coordinates intergovernmental 
information flow and multi-national information sharing. 
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(EU Commission, Health Threats Unit SANCO C3, slide 30, 2005). 
 
Figure 11.  EU EC HTU Information Sharing Nation to Nation Coordination Flow of 
Information Chart 
2. Isolated Span of Control to Integrated Sphere of Influence 
The European Union organizational structure supports intergovernmental leaders 
to address health security issues. The architecture of the structure is developed for 
specific member-state coordination strategies to be implemented via the HTU and the 
HEOF to serve the European countries in a manner that extends sovereign command and 
control of individual nations while protecting the individual sovereignty of nations. The 
intergovernmental structure provides access to intergovernmental information sharing 
and a mechanism to perform cooperation and a coordinated span of intergovernmental 
influence.   
Ultimately, the coordination of information flow strategies enhances the EU span 
of control countermeasures to be used in the event of an intentional biological WMD 
disease contaminant incident. The challenge is large. The vast span of control area 
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necessary to address a biological threat that crosses multiple jurisdictions and national 
borders is expansive. The effort requires addressing the sovereignty and borders that are 
also isolated to the sovereign jurisdiction of each country. The European Union appears 
to attempt to overcome this challenge by utilizing the intergovernmental sphere of 
influence. The method is the intergovernmental information sharing developed to address 
the necessary flow of nation-to-nation information.   
The EU’s supra-organizational structure includes shared decision-making 
structures, intergovernmental intelligence access, and innovative emerging medical 
intelligence tools. With these methods the challenge of an isolated span of control 
receives a force multiplier effect. This strategic intergovernmental structure and methods 
of intergovernmental information sharing provide the European Union with both an 
integrated and increased sphere of influence. This allows a stronger intergovernmental 
unity of effort and increases the capacity for each nation in the Europe Union to perform 
methods on an intergovernmental basis that each nation may not likely be able to perform 
to the same degree independently. In turn, the HTU added the support tool of generic 
preparedness planning to the HEOF functions. This tool addresses the structure under a 
collaborative command and control structure of the EU member states. Additionally, the 
National Command and Control structure includes rapid alert systems and surveillance 
along with the EU coordination structures. These structures, intergovernmental entities 
and systems, serve to enhance overall EU capacity to address protection from a biological 
threat. 
B. SYSTEM OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSNATIONAL LIAISONS 
AND LATERAL LEADERSHIP MODEL OF THE EU SPHERE OF 
INFLUENCE   
Additionally, the National Health Command and Control structure serves to 
liaison and address health authorities’ role when addressing a health threat. The National 
Health Command and Control is made up of leaders designated as National Health Risk 
Managers on specific areas of health threat need. These health threat managers are tasked 
with communicating with the National Command and Control structure as well as 
establishing and maintaining cooperation, as demonstrated in the preparedness planning 
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structures. This type of structure recognizes no individual country as command and 
control when addressing the biological WMD health threat in the EU system. Rather, 
collaborative preparedness planning adds function and framing for the collaborative 
requirements of the member states based on the surveillance and information systems 
utilized in the coordinated national command and control structure of Figure 12. 
 
 
(EU Commission, Health Threats Unit SANCO C3, slide 24, 2005). 
 
Figure 12.  EU EC HTU Information Sharing Health Threat Nation to Nation 
Structure & Planning Flow of Information Chart  
(From EU Commission, slide 25, 2005) 
The EU has identified two core areas to share information and manage and 
control health threats: (1) national institutes, ECDC, and the World Health Organization 
addressing risk assessment, and (2) national public health authorities performing risk 
management. Risk assessment stages are charged with identifying the health threat, 
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performing surveillance, and evaluating and addressing signals and alert triggers, which 
communicate the scale of the potential health threat. The risk management leadership 
activates the national command and control structure and implements the functional roles 
of liaison leaders to coordinate cooperative efforts as the fundamental principle in the 
national health command and control structure.   
The liaison function is a key role to the access and flow of the communication 
mechanism that serves to enhance intergovernmental information sharing. Inside the risk 
management core area, the structure is identified, not as “Command and Control,” but as 
the “Liaise and Control Structure.” This system incorporates the functions of span of 
control and the sphere of influence into areas that coexist, and it intentionally integrates 
the two necessary systems. Rather than only a command and control system, or only a 
sphere of influence system operating information sharing, a third system actively 
integrates the two systems into enhanced operations to address the biological threat. The 
intergovernmental communication mechanism (see Figure 13) serves as a force multiplier 
in addressing a biological threat.   
Additionally, the European Union has developed a medical intelligence system 
that serves as an operational platform to access and enhance shared situational awareness 
for the EU. This system format also allows the cascade force multiplier effect of 
performing necessary span-of-control operations while simultaneously performing 
sphere-of-influence liaison leadership attributes (EU Commission, slide 25, 2005). 
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Health Threat Unit SANCO C3
 
 
(EU Commission, Health Threats Unit SANCO C3, slide 25, 2005). 
 
Figure 13.  EU EC HTU Information Sharing Health Threat Liaise and Control 
Structure  (From EU Commission, slide 26, 2005) 
These multi-jurisdictional organizational leadership methods also serve to bridge 
necessary intelligence methods in the area of intergovernmental information sharing. This 
type of intergovernmental information-sharing method can contribute to the future shared 
situational awareness necessary to support the U.S. biological threat approach.  
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IX. U.S. TRIBAL NATIONS MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL 
A. U.S. TRIBAL NATIONS INFORMATION-SHARING APPROACH FOR 
THE H1N1 2009–2010 BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
Like the European Union, the organizational leadership methods of the U.S. 
Tribal Nations can teach us lessons about intergovernmental information sharing. The 
tribal communication mechanisms and governance methods of multi-jurisdictional 
leadership that enhance intergovernmental information sharing can also serve to 
strengthen our U.S. biological threat approach.   
One communication mechanism is the emerging syndromic surveillance system 
that the tribal health communities put into action early on in the H1N1 global pandemic 
influenza outbreak. Tribes reported experiencing community alerts and warnings early in 
the detection of the outbreak of sickness. Rather than waiting to respond, the tribal health 
community, in partnership with Indian Health Service (IHS), began to incorporate data 
and technology methods in a new pattern so as to capture emerging information.   
Tribal health communities sought to protect their people and prevent the outbreak 
of the disease by shifting from traditional medical intelligence, which is reactionary 
information that assists the tracking of the identified diagnosis, typically with lab results. 
In the interest of seeking prevention of the novel influenza H1N1outbreak in their 
community, tribal health clinics participated in new information-sharing methods. The 
results of the new communication mechanism were examined for lessons to enhance the 
U.S. biological threat approach. 
B. U.S. TRIBAL NATIONS / IHS H1N1 SHIFT IN STRATEGIC APPROACH 
TO MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 
The medical intelligence provided by traditional epidemic intelligence alone was 
neither efficient nor timely enough for the needs of decision makers in the H1N1 
pandemic influenza scenario. To move toward a successful effort of prevention during 
the initial public health response, U.S. tribes and the IHS utilized the available electronic 
health data from tribal health clinics to develop a new electronic syndromic surveillance 
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system called the IHS Influenza Awareness System (IIAS) (Keck, Redd, Cheek, & 
Layne, 2012).  
The new surveillance IIAS reports, posted weekly, provided information to 
decision makers. The reports provided capacity to utilize timely information regarding 
influenza-like illness (ILI), influenza vaccination rates, and other categories, so that data 
results could be utilized for the strategic allocation of limited resources (such as the 
H1N1 novel vaccine) during the pandemic (Keck et al., 2012). 
The IIAS was designed to monitor and report ambulatory visits at the tribal health 
clinics from walk-ins in categories identified for ILI and to protect patient privacy, the 
patient visit information was not identified or shared electronically (Keck et al., 2012). 
The goal of the IIAS syndromic surveillance effort was to identify in a manner as 
accurately and as timely as possible any cases of ILI that the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s (CDC) Influenza-like Illness Network (ILINET) would normally report 
(Keck et al., 2012, p. 6). The development inquiry’s primary question attempted to 
determine if the new syndromic surveillance system could report accurately and 
specifically for the AI/AN population, and yet also report in real time for decision 
makers. If possible, this type of information sharing of the electronic health data would 
monitor and provide an at-risk population assessment and an additional source of data to 
enrich the traditional medical intelligence capacity. The outreach to tribal health clinics 
might also make available critical missing data for providers or facilities participating in 
the traditional ILINET reporting.  
C. NEW U.S. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM RESULTS 
Figure 14 below shows the ILI visit percentage and timeframe across the H1N1 
pandemic of one year during week 4, April 2009, through week 3, April 2010. The dark 
line reflects the new IIAS syndromic system and the dotted line reflects the traditional 
ILINet surveillance reports. 
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Figure 14.  Surveillance Results (From Keck et al., 2012). 
The flow of surveillance data processed from ambulatory ILI visits, ILI 
hospitalizations, and HIN1 immunizations also provided H1N1 vaccine adverse event 
data (Keck et al., 2012). The IIAS system provided timeliness and an outreach to gather 
data across a large geographic area to an at-risk AI/AN population during the early 
intervention time of the H1N1 influenza pandemic. Based on the IIAS syndromic 
surveillance system data, during a time that vaccine supplies were not yet readily 
available for the novel H1N1 influenza across the entire U.S. population, IHS was able to 
prioritize vaccine distribution in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Navajo Nation, an at-
risk AI/AN population area bordering Mexico where the H1N1 disease originated (Keck 
et al., 2012). 
The U.S. Tribal Nations’ access and capabilities for intelligence are impacted by 
the cultural information-sharing processes. The IHS, an agency of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), is the federal health program for American Indians 
and Alaska Natives and the principal federal healthcare provider to that population due to 
the government-to-government relationship between the U.S. federal government and the 
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U.S. Indian tribes.5  Tribal Epidemiology Centers began in 1996 with core funding from 
the HHS IHS. There are currently 13 Tribal EpiCenters in the U.S. (Pueschel, 2008): 
 11 Tribal EpiCenters 
 1 Urban Indian EpiCenter (National) 
 1 Native Hawaiian EpiCenter (National) 
To address the geographic locations of the urban AI/AN, the Urban Indian Health 
Institute (UIHI) was created in 2000. The UIHI provides health surveillance and research 
affecting urban Indians. UIHI serves the Urban Indian Health Organizations, which are 
private non-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are reportedly 34 
Urban Indian Health Organizations in 19 states servings 94 counties. UIHI reports that of 
the 4.1 million AI/AN population, 67% live in urban areas (Pueschel, 2008). This fact is 
significant because the information sharing is of data surrounding a population that is not 
in one central geographical location. Rather, more than half of the AI/AN population is 
located off reservation and living in urban areas across the U.S. Together, the IHS 
surveillance system and the work of the UIHI surveillance system combine to present the 
epidemic intelligence of U.S. tribal communities. This epidemic intelligence also serves 
as a potential early alert and warning system for the rest of the United States. 
The Navajo Epidemiology Center (NEC) of the Navajo Division of Health based 
in Window Rock, Arizona, reports examples of limitations of the epidemic intelligence 
access for U.S. tribal communities. The NEC reports the Navajo Nation geography spans 
three states and 27,000 square miles (Navajo Epidemiology Center [NEC], 2011, slide 
24). Along with the sheer size of the territory is the added challenge of servicing rural 
and remote areas.  
The challenge of limited data to the NEC is a barrier for addressing tribal health 
capacity for the Navajo Nation. IHS collects nearly all tribal clinical and injury data on 
the Navajo Nation. The NEC reports challenges that the IHS clinical data system has 
limited access and Memorandums of Agreement are needed. The IHS clinical data is 
                                                 
5 This relationship, established in 1787, is based on Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, and has 
been given form and substance by numerous treaties, laws, Supreme Court decisions, and Executive Orders 
(U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8). 
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decentralized, so to access the data, the barrier to each health care facility’s data has to be 
addressed. Additional barriers include data quality issues such as completeness, 
consistency, and validity (Pueschel, 2008).   
D. H1N1 PANDEMIC INFLUENZA CATALYST FOR MEDICAL 
INTELLIGENCE INNOVATION 
In the first portion of 2009, while the H1N1 pandemic was initially making the 
original disease outbreak and what would later become the first wave of the 2009 H1N1 
global pandemic influenza, the tribal nations and health care providers in the field were 
reportedly addressing “walk overs” from Mexico who were bringing illness onto U.S. 
tribal lands and ultimately into health clinics. U.S. tribes worked with HHS, IHS, and 
partners CDC and FDA, in an attempt to reach out and access data that could be utilized 
to report and monitor the rapid changes in the novel disease impacting the AI/AN 
population. Prevention was identified as an early goal. The utilization of electronic health 
records (EHR) for public health surveillance work was initiated to develop an H1N1 
surveillance system to provide real-time data.  
 
 
 
 
 78
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 79
X. LATERAL GOVERNANCE MODELS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND U.S. TRIBAL NATIONS 
A. TRIBAL LEADERSHIP MODEL MAY SUPPORT REMOVING SILO 
BARRIERS TO BIODEFENSE 
The American Indian leadership formulated a crosscutting layered leadership 
system. Gearing’s study of a Cherokee village discusses this type of indigenous decision-
making activity (Gearing, 2000). The system consists of groups or a body of elders made 
up of specific categories of tribal members identified by age, gender, and positional duty. 
The groups were typically identified also by the meeting space access in proximity to the 
decision-making discussion. The groups in relationship to the decision-making discussion 
were located strategically for crosscutting discussions representing the needs and 
perspectives from each clan in the Cherokee village. The discussions were critical to the 
outcomes for the tribe as the discussions were the basis of decision making.  
The body of elders was male and each man represented one tribal clan. The inner 
council consisted of the foremost officials: one priest chief, three priests, and one secular 
officer. These officials shared a facilitation and listening witness role to the body of 
elders. The priest chief had seven inner councils of clansmen in the body of elders, each 
representing a different clan in the village. The remaining body of elders was identified 
as the “beloved men” and consisted of the rest of the men aged 55 and older of all of the 
clans in the village.  
Figure 15 demonstrates the tribal leadership leading across silos per the above 
description from Gearing’s study of decision making at a tribal leadership body of elders’ 
meeting of a Cherokee village.  
 
 
 80
 
Figure 15.  Tribal Governance Lateral Leadership and Two-Way Information Sharing 
Enhancing Shared Situational Awareness   
When this decision-making model is applied to the concept of an 
intergovernmental mega-community, the crosscutting voice which the body of elders 
created is significant as a multi-directional flow of information in a lateral line 
communication mechanism. Thus, the information flow is not a one-way information 
flow that can be typically found in a command and control scenario. Rather, the 
information flow is two-way communication between each of the clansmen 
representatives and the body of elders. Additionally, the discussion and information flow 
of needs and perspectives of various threats and opportunities to the Cherokee village 
flows bi-directionally, encircling the layered leadership structure. This allows an 
opportunity to capture the big picture of an issue and apply the most applicable problem 
solving to the decision-making process.  
Each of the clans retains its own decision-making capacity and its sovereignty or 
own command and control opportunity over its own specific clan. Yet the clans also 
engage in an open sphere of influence for the intergovernmental needs of each clan of 
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that tribal village. Decisions are not completed in a top-down hierarchy model. Rather, 
tribal leadership in this example included diversity of the clansmen leading across silos of 
the clans that made up the entire village.  
1. U.S. Tribal Nations Lateral Leadership Model to Crosscut 
Intergovernmental Structure Silo Barriers  
Organizational silos exist within the various sectors of private industry, NGOs, 
and federal, state, local, and tribal governments. Attempting to globally, or even locally, 
remove the organizational silos is nearly impossible due to political territories existing 
from organizational hierarchies. To overcome this obstacle, this thesis recommends 
proactively developing a diverse biological threat approach leadership model utilizing the 
U.S. Tribal Nations’ lateral leadership model. Specific leadership roles should be 
developed that will receive organizational and administrative leadership liaisons in order 
to effectively perform intergovernmental and multi-jurisdictional outreach and lead 
across intergovernmental structure silo barriers to enhance U.S. biological threat 
approach capacity. 
2. Limits on Available Indigenous Leadership Research  
Little academic literature exists on AI/AN research of historical and traditional 
methods of U.S. Tribal Nations governance and leadership. Additionally, gaps exist in the 
research documented from the U.S. Tribal Nations’ perspective. The missing documented 
accounts of historical AI/AN leadership methods are perhaps due to the cultural traditions 
of AI/AN oral history and perhaps due to respect of a sacred trust of cultural history at 
the elder and leader level of tribal members. These cultural traditions are deeply valued 
and personally transferred from generation to generation in strength and tenderness 
within and to the tribal community. Researchers tend to have shared a focus on 
understanding the tribal leadership and governance methods inside the framework of the 
European-American understanding of “government.” This thesis takes a look at 
traditional and various American Indian leadership methods, many of which are distinct 
from the governance system of the U.S.  
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According to Rebuilding Tribal Nations, “Cultural mismatch has been at the heart 
of the dysfunction experienced by many tribal governments over the twentieth century” 
(Jorgensen, 2007, p. 49). The history, culture, and traditions over generations of the 
AI/AN experience, both predating the arrival of the founding of a U.S. Constitution and 
what we know as the United States government of today, as well as current U.S. Tribal 
Nations’ government systems across America, impact the U.S. Tribal leadership 
processes and decision making of today. 
B. EU SUPRA-ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 
The EU has developed an information exchange system that creates opportunity 
for intergovernmental access to medical intelligence among its diverse member states 
(European Media Monitor System MedISys, 2008). The information access system for 
the EU biological threat approach includes a liaise control structure, a command control 
structure, and a critical information exchange mechanism which strategically links the 
two necessary biological threat approach performance areas to access of medical 
intelligence. The structure is outlined in the diagram below (see Figure 16). The liaise 
control structure includes a focus on risk assessment, scientific data, intelligence, and 
alert and warning systems. The command control structure focuses on notifications, 
activations and deployments, authorities, and risk management activities. Neither 
component of the EU model, which encompasses the 27 member states’ agreements of 
information sharing, appear to have a priority or hierarchy; thus, neither the command 
control structure nor the liaison control structure is outlined with more authority than the 
other. There is health security equity. The key and critical structure that the EU has 
developed is the mechanism of information exchange between the two control structures. 
This mechanism is established as the role of the EU health security liaison leadership. 
The information sharing is a two-way model that pushes and pulls medical intelligence 
information for the EU health security biological threat approach. 
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Figure 16.  European Union Information Sharing Communication Mechanism  
C. INTERGOVERNMENTAL LATERAL LINE COMMUNICATION 
MECHANISM 
Organizational structures, however, experience gaps in lateral communication at 
all levels. Lateral communication allows for information sharing, problem solving, 
developing trust, and initiating actions that cross jurisdictions to create a solution to 
problems that are too complex and overwhelming for one entity. Communication 
processes are often reactionary, and information is protected and stove-piped. When a 
crisis or complex problem develops or is recognized, information sharing is sought. Often 
the interdependence of overarching goals is missed at various levels, and often leaders 
will spend their time attempting to determine who owns the problem and which 
jurisdiction it falls in, so as to ascertain if they must address the problem or leave it for 
others. At some point, complex and overwhelming problems belong to multiple, often 
cross-jurisdictional, authorities. Some of the complex problems and missions, such as 
public health and safety, homeland defense, and national security, at some point, belong 
to everyone. 
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A lateral line sensory system consisting of layers of lateral leadership is 
recommended for development to address the barriers of communication and information 
sharing. If the ability and capacity of the lateral line sensory system of organizational 
types can be successfully utilized in the form of identifiable structure system dots, then a 
lateral line sensory system could be developed in a strategic medical intelligence system 
to support biodefense. The structure system dots would be made of up the designated 
layers of lateral leadership which are composed of various organizational structures, 
including the multiple cultural organizational languages and variables as attributes in the 
framework. Moving toward a swarming type of collective intelligence potentially 
strengthens both the medical intelligence and the biodefense capacity. The health system 
composed of tri-sector factors may have, along with law enforcement and intelligence 
services, one of the initial strongest building bases for an enhanced intelligence capability 
to successfully create a new medical intelligence system. 
1. Shared Situational Awareness 
These multi-jurisdictional organizational intergovernmental leadership methods 
also bridge to intelligence methods in the area of information sharing that contributes to 
an intergovernmental shared situational awareness. The EU continues to develop multi-
national capabilities of alert notifications and a multi-national information distribution 
system. The information sharing methods would require access equity for the member 
states. The result would increase the 27 countries’ sphere of influence on the capabilities 
of their SSA and the ability to address a potential biological threat in their regions of the 
globe. This multi-national cooperation in the supra-organizational structure of the EU 
extends each member state’s sovereign command and control to include a shared resource 
of multi-national cooperation and coordination capacity for a larger span of influence to 
protect each individual nation’s citizenry. 
2. Swarm Intelligence Impacts Real-Time Decisions 
Depending on the perspective and differences, clusters and communities will 
often overlap and form a network. Collective choices in real time, observed in nature in 
birds flying in flocks or fish swimming in schools, impact time trends and decision 
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making. By reviewing the theories of how swarming occurs when birds form a flock and 
fish form schools, medical intelligence framework system support elements can be 
identified to develop future biological threat approaches that support biodefense. Thus, 
intergovernmental swarming would be achieved. 
D. INTERGOVERNMENTAL SWARMING 
1. Homeland Security Challenge  
A key challenge to utilizing the natural disease-driven epidemiology approach to 
addressing a manmade terrorist deployment of a biological WMD is that the terrorist 
deployment of a bioweapon is a process of intentional and manipulated disease spread. 
This intentional use of pathogens could be different than a natural disease spread, which 
can follow a more traditionally anticipated path. Terrorist actions are not as predictable as 
natural disease spread. The effects of time occurring within an intentional deployment of 
a pathogen versus a natural biological threat create an additional risk of reduced 
countermeasure capacity toward a terrorist bioweapon. If the policy and decision-making 
approach to a terrorist-driven biological threat is premised upon the policy and decision-
making of a natural biological threat, decision-making time may be lost. 
2. Opportunity  
Enhance the U.S. biological threat approach by utilizing the lessons learned from 
the intergovernmental leadership models of the EU and the U.S. Tribal Nations and by 
identifying methods of intergovernmental information sharing employed by the coalition 
of governments to collectively impact decision making. The models may also reveal 
opportunities to improve future U.S. activity indicators in the prevention period. 
Additionally, should a terrorist deployment cover multiple locations and need 
crosscutting time-period decision making, then the concept of intergovernmental 
swarming (such as discussed in reference to nature’s model of SSA method of 
performing unity of effort) may be an opportunity to strengthen the U.S. biological threat 
approach. 
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3. Data and Discussion  
The EU and the U.S. Tribal Nations had higher results than the U.S. and GHSI in 
the prevention period (see Figure 17). Those intergovernmental coalitions also had 
patterns of tighter grouping of results in the outcomes within the four time periods of 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. The same pattern of results is not 
represented in the outcomes of the GHSI and the U.S. According to the sample coalitions 
of governments’ health security policies, indicators identified several actions that the 
intergovernmental leadership intended to execute. But the after-action reviews revealed 
the indicators of actual actions (identified by time periods of prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery), did not have the same emphasis as the stated intended action 
indicators. Thus, the intended action indicators of the health security policies did not 
match the implementation action indicators reported.  
Although scores of the intended actions and scores of the actual actions have 
different criteria, for the purpose of this study they each have indicator criteria identifying 
context for the sample’s biological threat approach. The comparison basis is that of the 
identified biological threat approach of the sample in regard to the prevention period, first 
pre-incident in the stated health security polices, then post-incident, with the H1N1 
incident of 2009–2010 being an actual global biological threat. It is noted that the H1N1 
pandemic influenza threat was a natural source and not an intentional terrorist use of a 
bioweapon. However, by comparing the stated indicator intended actions specific to a 
biological threat to that of actual indicator actions of a specific threat, the 
intergovernmental leadership emphasis of addressing biological threats can then be 
compared. 
The U.S. biological threat approach’s capacity to address necessary threat 
reduction activities may be reduced in the prevention period by a shortage of resources, 
including time. Improving the U.S. national security capacity to address intentions and 
performance actions to reduce the biological threat in the pre-incident period of 
prevention can have additional positive impacts proven over time.   Additionally, future 
research and developments can produce additional intergovernmental strategic prevention 
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methods to enhance the necessary intergovernmental sphere of influence to improve 
intergovernmental unity of effort to support biodefense.  
Also critical to strengthening the concept of whole community is the successful 
performance of emergency and civil defense activities across the four time periods. 
Intergovernmental leadership models of the EU and the U.S. Tribal Nations may assist in 
improving the U.S. biological threat approach in the prevention period, as well as 
enhance capacity in all four time periods. 
 
Figure 17.  Comparison by Time Periods of Health Security Policy Intended Actions 
to H1N1 Global Pandemic Influenza 2009–2010  
The following sections will examine and discuss the complex intergovernmental 
organizational structure, its limitations, and the intergovernmental mega-community 
solution. 
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E. COMPLEX INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE  
For generations, traditional public health has implemented small scale natural 
disease management within one clinic or hospital in one health jurisdiction for necessary 
treatment and containment. Transferring or applying the traditional public health small-
scale disease management practices to the concept of a large-scale catastrophic use of an 
offensive bioweapon is a challenge. The geographical location is a concern, whether 
inside the borders of the U.S. or abroad. In a global health incident, the threat will require 
vastly different approaches due to the threat and the management of one of the greatest 
resources available, time. 
Potential smart practices of each intergovernmental organization structure are 
identified utilizing multi-jurisdictional organizational leadership methods distinct to the 
EU and the U.S. Tribal Nations, as well as implications of each structure to medical 
intelligence in the context of public health security needs.  
The EU utilizes an organizational structure consisting of various member states, 
each its own individual state of sovereignty with unique political and citizenry needs. 
When diverse multi-jurisdiction needs are encountered in the EU, the member states’ 
laws and applications of authority can create various potential choke points for decision 
making in actions that move across boundaries and territories.  
The U.S. Tribal Nations utilize methods similar to the EU supra-organizational 
structure. U.S. Tribal Nations uniquely utilizes a non-profit sector format to form its 
governance structure and achieve recognition from the federal government. A tall 
organizational structure with aspects of a flat organizational structure within various 
federal agencies is used based on the specific individual federal agency need.   
F. INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEGA-COMMUNITY SOLUTION  
The biological threat problem requires a multi-organizational solution. In 
Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle 
Today’s Global Challenges Together, the initiators of a multi-organizational solution are 
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described as the catalyst to convert a latent structure into an active state (Gerencser et al., 
2009).   
A mega-community might already exist in a latent state as a result of the 
presence of an overlapping set of issues. Most likely, this latent mega-
community will have reached a threshold at which the value of the cross 
sector action is evident. But the mega-community will not move from 
latent to active on its own. While the potential energy is there, the creation 
of the mega community requires a catalyst to convert the potential energy 
into action. Allowing for the fact that in a moment of crisis such as a 
natural disaster a mega-community might spontaneously emerge, in most 
cases an initiator or a group of initiators will have to step  
forward. (Gerencser et al., 2009, p. 113) 
Our biological threat problem has a type of existing public health and safety 
active. Tri-sector overlapping needs and issues exist.  
Intergovernmental biological threat approach lateral leaders must be identified to 
serve as a catalyst activity in a biological threat approach mega-community. To initiate 
the concept and facilitate building access to layered leadership, a forum must be 
developed so that these potential lateral leaders can come together and collectively serve 
as multi-jurisdictional BTA initiator leaders across sectors.  
The strategy of addressing intergovernmental cross-sector work with public, 
private, NGO, and government sectors delivers a broader platform to produce the best 
outcomes in infectious disease management and disease containment, increasing public 
health and safety. Additionally, this strategy protects both the civil defense force and the 
military force operations by their working together to strengthen biological threat 
capacity to manage infectious disease.  
1. Two Dichotomous Decision-Making Systems Applied to the 
Intergovernmental Mega-Community 
Two sharply distinguished decision-making systems exist: the American Indian 
leadership system model and the U.S. governance system model. Further review of the 
two systems of decision making allows the impact to the biological WMD threat to be 
examined. 
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First, the U.S. government, which derives roots from a European political system, 
is a bureaucratic organizational structure. In this governance structure authority is 
translated into public power as the citizenry submits decision making to elected positions 
that represent the individual among the nation. This power is entrusted to the 
predetermined laws and standard of rule into an organizational structure of accepted 
enforcement powers of authority and rule of governance. 
Second, the AI governance system is a complex cultural system of tribal 
leadership, of which no one individual is given his or her freedom of decision making 
over another body. The responsibility of power and accountability is, contextually, 
sovereign to the individual. The tribal members protect and respect the freedom of the 
AI/AN individual while preserving the U.S. Tribal Nations’ sovereignty in the right to 
govern the tribes.  
While the U.S. government decision-making system operates as one of checks 
and balances with power that resides at the state and local levels unless otherwise set by 
the Constitution. This system flows toward the concept of jurisdictions of governance 
which utilize a concept of delegated authorities via the citizens within a type of command 
and control system to implement the power. In comparison, the American Indian 
governance system operates with a fundamental value of sovereign freedom for the 
AI/AN individual. This fundamental governance method translates into the upholding of 
sovereignty issues based in U.S. constitutional rights and treaties. Governance is 
commonly defined as the exercise of authority, control, or power. Yet the AI/AN upholds 
cultural values which respects the position of self-governance. According to Tracy 
Becker and John Poupart, American Indians did not traditionally “govern” themselves, 
and it is inaccurate to try to fit American Indian leadership paradigms into this conceptual 
framework (Becker et al., 1997). 
2. Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure  
Michael G. Jacobides examines the role and limits of organizational structure in 
his paper “The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of 
Hierarchy: Lessons from a Near-War” (Jacobides, 2007). Figure 18 is from an analysis 
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from the perspective of Greek officials in examination of the impact of their decision-
making failures in a near-war scenario. Although the war was averted, a reported feeling 
of defeat prevailed in Greece. Further examination revealed that the escalation was the 
result of major underlying processes that were factors underpinning the dynamics of the 
decision making. The factors identified in this case were decisions based upon 
“interactions among different organizational subgroups” (Jacobides, 2007, p. 463).  
Jacobides goes on to identify that the division of labor, compartmentalization, and 
the inherent limits of local frames were the lens of perspective through which decisions 
were made. The hierarchy and lack of hierarchy drove decisions in various 
confrontational decision points. Jacobides notes (2007) that the organizational structure 
of the position in the incident impacted the decision that escalated the country toward 
war. The military naval commander, assigned to and focused on tactical supremacy, 
interpreted the situation as a need to restore the national symbol. The cultural 
interpretation was in conflict with the diplomatic strategy. Despite a decision to de-
escalate, the diplomatic representative was overlooked in the decision-making structure 
and not given an opportunity to be the first to respond in the crisis situation. The 
politician and senior minister, with no direct experience in foreign affairs, defense, or 
prime-ministerial duties, moved forward in his role as experienced politician, satisfying 
the media and national opinion while provoking a direct confrontation. Jacobides utilizes 
his chart (Figure 18) and describes that there is no structure to facilitate the interaction of 
decision makers from different units to arrive at more nuanced views. According to 
Jacobides, “There was no mechanism to incite the ministers of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs to systematically exchange views” (2007, p. 467). 
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Figure 18.  Jacobides’ Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchy (From Jacobides, 2007) 
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This organizational diagram of structure and hierarchy’s functions shows 
Jacobides’ point that the architecture of an organizational structure presents ways of 
dividing labor that allow a specific set of informational inputs to process through an 
organization and impact decision making. The organizational structure can also be such 
that informational inputs can set new organizational frames to emerge, which impact 
decision making. Jacobides states, “This is the ‘cybernetic control’ function of hierarchy” 
(Jacobides, 2007).  
The various organizational structures likely have the information and frames 
available (Snook 1997; Vaughan 1996); however, Jacobides points out that “they do not 
partake in the decision-making process” (Jacobides, 2007). The way the information is 
aggregated and presented affects decisions (George, 1972). 
3. Recommendation 
The intergovernmental organizational structure that supports the concepts of self-
governance may be captured and harnessed for the purposes of enhancing 
intergovernmental information sharing processes. The use of intergovernmental lateral 
leadership and decision-making processes in various time periods may trigger access to a 
pattern of intergovernmental swarming in the grouping relationships of decision-making 
activities across time periods. This structure may enhance the intergovernmental mega-
community to be active, more interactive, and able to access the intangible efforts and 
patterns of emergence via the communication mechanisms that the EU and the U.S. 
Tribal Nations have developed. This structure may be the enhanced ability to 
communicate timely decision making from the intergovernmental models operating in the 
prevention period that allow both areas in the sample to perform a type of 
intergovernmental swarming.  
Perhaps these identified intergovernmental communication mechanisms are what 
provided opportunity for the EU and the U.S. Tribal Nations to experience their overall 
performance effects. For each of the four time periods, they indicated grouping patterns 
in both the health security policy indicators and the reported after action and lessons 
learned of the H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 2009–2010. These grouping patterns 
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resulted in the prevention period scores advancing. Yet the other time periods also scored 
in a pattern to the collective grouping rather than being not represented or having low 
scores in comparison to the pre-incident period of prevention. 
G. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
1. Limitations of Natural Biological Threat Strategies to Biodefense 
Strategies 
The lessons learned from the examination of the natural biological threat incident 
of H1N1 global pandemic influenza of 2009–2010 are not derived from an intentional 
terrorist use of a bioweapon as a WMD. However, the risk of a terrorist biological threat 
compared to a natural biological threat has value for consideration in a study of biological 
threat approach because the natural biological threat also includes the period of disease 
transmission and the impact of the latent time period during a biological attack scale of 
potential harm. The manmade threat is growing. Due to the access to life-science 
expertise and technology advancements, it is possible for pathogens and chemical 
weapons to be covertly grown, prepared, and transported (Barrett & Goure, 2008, p. 1). 
Yet, since there are no historical large-scale terrorist bioattacks to study, the 
lessons learned from policy and decision making of a large-scale natural biological threat 
incident must be employed. The study of the health security policy and decision making 
in the H1N1 global pandemic 2009–2010 is a key factor to presenting a basis upon which 
to further study and recommend future biological threat-prevention methods. 
Recommending future biological threat prevention methods is important because 
the large scale of a manmade terrorist deployment of a biological WPM can produce 
more harm and loss of life than a natural biological threat. This is due in part to the causal 
inference and larger scale of potential harm from an intentional deployment, as well as 
the deployment impact to the traditional naturally driven pathogen latency time period. 
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XI. U.S. NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
The United States’ health security policy, which includes the 2009 U.S. National 
Health Security Strategy (NHSS), provides the first comprehensive strategic approach to 
addressing U.S. health security, including terrorist attacks (DHHS, 2012). The 
subsequent 2012 implementation plan defines national health security as follows: 
“National health security is achieved when the Nation and its people are prepared for, 
protected from, respond effectively to, and are able to recover from incidents with 
potentially negative health consequences” (U.S. DHHS, National Health Security 
Strategy, 2012).  
The goals for the 2009 and the subsequent 2012 NHSS framework include (a) 
building community resilience, and (b) strengthening and sustaining health and 
emergency response systems. Both goals focus on activities of time tiers 1–3: the periods 
of preparedness, response, and recovery. Including time tier 0, the prevention period, in 
the strategic objectives would fill the gap created by having the operational capabilities 
and strategic objectives focused only on the goals of time tiers 1–3.    
The objectives of the 2009 NHSS framework, in cooperation with the 2012 
Implementation Plan for the U.S. National Health Security Strategy, are as follows 
(DHHS): 
 Informed and empowered individuals 
 National health security workforce 
 Integrated, scalable healthcare delivery systems 
 Situational awareness 
 Timely and effective communications 
 Effective countermeasures enterprise 
 Prevention or mitigation of environmental and other emerging health 
threats 
 Post-incident health recovery in planning and response 
 Cross-border and global partnerships to enhance national, continental, and 
global health security  
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 Science, evaluation, and quality improvement 
A key theme and assumption of the 2012 NHSS implementation plan is based on 
the premise that “achieving national health security requires a collaborative approach” 
(DHHS, 2012).  
The recommended strategic objectives in Figure 19 would partner to achieve 
national health security based upon lessons learned from the health security policy review 
and biological threat incident reports of the H1N1 influenza global pandemic of 2009–
2010. Additionally, the recommendations include lessons learned from the medical 
intelligence model study of the EU and U.S. Tribal Nations. For reference, 
recommendations have been inserted into the relevant component areas of the current 
NHSS framework model (DHHS, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 19.  NHSS NHS Framework Including Recommended Medical Intelligence 
Strategic Objectives. Achieving National Health Security  
 97
A. ACTIONABLE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO SUPPORT U.S. 
NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
The recommended processes would use technology to integrate meta-intelligence 
and intergovernmental communication mechanisms in order to develop medical 
intelligence to enhance decision making and support biodefense. Strategic pre-incident 
medical intelligence should be applied to support the development of biological threat 
prevention methods, and to strengthen and sustain public health and emergency response 
systems.   
Recommended strategic objectives for the development of a communication 
mechanism and lateral line framework to support biodefense follow.  
1. Recommended U.S. Medical Intelligence Framework   
The following goals support the proposed NHSS National Health Security (NHS) 
framework model, which includes recommended medical intelligence strategic 
objectives.  
 Build strategic pre-incident medical intelligence model. 
 Develop a biological WMD prevention strategy time tier 0 that will also serve in a 
dual-use capacity to strengthen health and emergency systems. 
2. Recommendations Based on European Union Lessons Learned 
U.S. National Health Security Strategic Objectives 1–10 and Medical Intelligence 
(MI) Strategic Objectives 1–10 should be implemented to include the following:   
1. U.S. NHS 1—MI 1 Develop a strategic pre-incident medical intelligence 
tool such as the “meta-intelligence” model with emerging technology to 
support intergovernmental information sharing and timely decision 
making. 
2. U.S. NHS 2—MI 2: Recruit and train an NHS workforce of lateral line 
leaders and pre-incident medical intelligence biological threat-prevention 
technical experts and strategists. 
3. U.S. NHS 3—MI 3: Develop and integrate strategic dual-use pre-incident 
medical intelligence to support healthcare and civil defense delivery 
systems to improve public health and safety and prepare for emergency 
incident use. 
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4. U.S. NHS 4—MI 4: Develop an intergovernmental communication 
mechanism using the lateral line system to enhance medical intelligence 
access and shared situational awareness. 
5. U.S. NHS 5—MI 5: Develop a strategic medical intelligence tool to 
enhance timely communication to support operations in the pre-incident 
time period. 
3. Recommendations Based on the U.S. Tribal Nations Lessons Learned 
1. U.S. NHS 6—MI 6:  Develop a strategic emerging medical intelligence 
tool to anticipate potential countermeasure requirements for at-risk 
populations to support options for deployment of biological threat 
countermeasures such as antibiotics and vaccine. 
2. U.S. NHS 7—MI 7:  Develop strategic prevention methods based on 
timely emerging medical intelligence to support and enhance U.S. 
biodefense capacity to successfully prevent or counter the terrorist use of 
biological weapons of mass destruction. 
3. U.S. NHS 8—MI 8:  Utilize medical intelligence to anticipate the recovery 
resources and support necessary for community health recovery. 
4. U.S. NHS 9—MI 9:  Develop an intergovernmental meta-intelligence tool 
and layered lateral leadership system, a function of liaise control structure 
that will operate simultaneously and in cooperation with command control 
structure to enhance intergovernmental cross-border and global health 
security partnerships. 
5. U.S. NHS 10—MI 10: Develop an emerging medical intelligence tool to 
integrate life sciences research and development for meta-intelligence 
products, quality improvement, and medical countermeasures decision 
making that support a U.S. biological threat approach in support of 
biodefense. 
B. CONCLUSION   
The first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR) February 2010, 
identifies key areas that strengthen U.S. homeland security (Napolitano, 2010). Three of 
those areas are also specific key areas of study in this thesis: (1) shared awareness of risks 
and threats, (2) unity of effort across all participants in the homeland security enterprise, 
and (3) innovation through active application of leading-edge science and technology 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010).   
As life science research and technologies advance and the evolving global threat 
environment changes, strategically operated decision making in advance of the U.S.’s 
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adversaries’ efforts to destroy the security and public health and safety of the nation 
becomes crucial to homeland security. A terrorist use of a biological WMD would create 
a significant and potentially catastrophic threat to U.S. national security. Successful 
efforts to transform health security policies are no less urgent and essential than 
protecting large population groups from the consequences of biological destruction. The 
world is aware of the effects of large scale destruction. Nuclear attack and its real threat 
remains a constant reminder of mankind’s vulnerability to catastrophic events. Biological 
weapons of mass destruction hold similar destructive capacity, but receive much less 
preventive attention and concentrated preparation. 
The experiences examined by this thesis offer essential clues of how to prevent a 
WMD attack. They show that it is possible and vital to establish policies that reorient 
preparations toward prevention rather than response, and that transformative 
organizational designs are possible and vital to achieving prevention and rapid mitigation. 
Additionally, these experiences show how effective leaders are able to lead organizations 
in a collective action that has escaped past efforts to coordinate and integrate across 
jurisdictional boundaries.   
U.S. health security policy is distinctively incomplete without steps in these 
directions. Prevention is a key factor, but the U.S. policy pays little attention to it. 
Collective coordination is rare, while organizational turf and disjointed, silo-ridden 
capabilities are making effective action difficult. Poor leadership is revealed in the 
numerous instances of disaster planning where successful response is noteworthy because 
successful response is so rare. This thesis argues that a new biological WMD prevention 
strategy is urgently needed, shows examples of how that strategy would work, and calls 
on national and international leaders to step up to the challenge before it is too late.   
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APPENDIX.  THE META-INTELLIGENCE MODEL AND THE FIVE 
DIMENSIONS OF META-INTELLIGENCE 
A. STRATEGIC META-INTELLIGENCE MODEL  
Applying the concept of the five dimensions of the meta-leadership model 
(Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006), the following recommendation includes a concept 
of evolving meta-analysis in order to develop a homeland defense intelligence product to 
support biological threat decision making. Designed to work in cooperation with the 
meta-leadership model to address the biological threat, the proposed meta-intelligence 
model incorporates five dimensions to provide an organizational framework for 
classifying the layers of a biological threat that need national security intelligence 
products. The proposed meta-intelligence model includes performing meta-analysis and 
developing national security intelligence products within the following five dimensions.    
B. INTELLIGENCE FOR THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT INDIVIDUAL 
META-LEADERS   
The meta-leader aptitude for the “big picture” identifies a different type of 
medical intelligence product need. In order to develop medical intelligence big-picture-
type intelligence products to support the meta-leader, individual meta-intelligence 
dimensions must be considered. Not for just senior leaders in the organizational 
hierarchy, the medical intelligence products in dimension one will serve to form the 
strategic links and leverages necessary for meta-leaders to guide beyond the crisis.  
C. INTELLIGENCE FOR THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT SITUATIONS OR 
EVENTS  
As the biological threat becomes more complex, the biological threat decision 
making requires more complex critical thinking. The medical intelligence products in 
meta-intelligence dimension two include factual, evidence-based, actionable intelligence 
of current barriers, threats, occurrences. Biological threat approach medical intelligence 
products should be developed that present real-time, evidence-based, and actionable 
descriptors of the biological threat incident situation based upon time tiers 0–3. These 
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products would use expanded medical intelligence models similar to the European 
Union’s MedISys methodology and the U.S. Tribal Nations’ emerging syndromic 
surveillance method. Technology such as visual analytics and geo-spatial tools would be 
used to improve real-time information sharing and multi-jurisdictional organizational 
native language interpretation needs. 
D. INTELLIGENCE FOR THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT CULTURE SILOS 
Each biological threat approach silo exists and each organizational silo must serve 
and contribute effectively to the overall efforts. Meta-intelligence dimension three will 
develop medical intelligence products that are appropriate and specific to the native 
organizational language and leadership cultures of the various silos. This seems 
counterintuitive to the overall target of organizational connectivity; however, specific 
silos have specific medical intelligence needs. The challenge is that one medical 
intelligence product, such as the current traditional bio-surveillance system, is not 
sufficient to serve the meta-leaders’ needs for a catastrophic biological threat.   
E. INTELLIGENCE FOR THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT CONTEXT 
LEADING UP  
Leaders are necessary at all levels within the organizational silos. The concept 
that only the leader at the top of the hierarchy requires medical intelligence to address a 
biological threat is not accurate. Meta-leaders who perform leading up the organizational 
silo need access to additional medical intelligence products. Meta-intelligence dimension 
four will develop medical intelligence products that will enable the meta-leader to access 
diverse biological threat approach intelligence. This intelligence will enhance the meta-
leader’s capacity to perform critical thinking and to address potential terrorist use of a 
bioweapon. These products are needed for the layered leadership roles in agency 
organization.   
F. INTELLIGENCE FOR THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT CONNECTIVITY 
LEADING ACROSS  
Additionally, meta-leaders will be required to function outside their 
organizational silos. The enhanced capacity to perform liaison leadership functions 
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impacts the overall ability to accomplish the incident mission. To support the required 
crisis leadership function, meta-intelligence dimension five will develop biological threat 
approach medical intelligence products which will serve organizational connectivity 
across the “lateral line.”   The liaison and the policy maker across the organizational silos 
in the biological threat mega-community will need a variety of diverse strategic medical 
intelligence products, and technology can provide access to those products.  
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